Risk and failure in bank management by Vajdickova, Eva
 
 
 
 
DIPLOMARBEIT 
 
Titel der Diplomarbeit 
 
„Risk and failure in bank management: The example of UBS 
and Citigroup“ 
 
 
 
 
 
Verfasserin 
 
Eva Vajdickova 
 
angestrebter akademischer Grad 
 
Magister der Sozial- und 
Wirtschaftswissenschaften 
 
(Mag. rer. soc. oec.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Wien, im Oktober 2009 
 
 
 
 
 
Studienkennzahl lt.     Studienblatt A157 
Studienrichtung lt. Studienblatt    Internationale 
Betriebswirtschaftslehre 
Betreuer      em. Professor Dr. Erich W. Streissler 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
Table of Contents 
List of Figures and Tables .......................................................... 3 
List of Abbreviations .................................................................. 4 
1  Introduction .......................................................................... 5 
2  Economic crises, financial crises and bank failures .......... 7 
2.1  Bank Failure ........................................................................................ 7 
2.1.1  Position of a bank in a financial crisis ......................................... 8 
2.1.2  Causalities of bank failure ............................................................ 9 
2.1.3  Early warnings of banking crises ............................................... 11 
3  Historical comparison ........................................................ 13 
3.1  The Great Depression of the 1930s ................................................... 13 
3.2  Nordic Banking Crises of the 1990s .................................................. 16 
3.3  The Crisis of the Austrian Creditanstalt 1931 ................................... 19 
4  Universal and separated banking system ......................... 22 
5  Types of key risks in a financial institution ..................... 24 
5.1  Introduction ....................................................................................... 24 
5.2  Credit Risk ......................................................................................... 26 
5.3  Market Risk ....................................................................................... 28 
5.3.1  Definition ................................................................................... 28 
5.4  Operational Risk ................................................................................ 28 
5.4.1  Definition of Operational risk .................................................... 29 
5.4.2  Operational Risk under the Basel Accord .................................. 30 
6  Theory of Regulation ......................................................... 33 
6.1  Introduction ....................................................................................... 33 
6.2  Main subjects of regulation ............................................................... 33 
6.2.1  Maintain safe and sound financial system ................................. 34 
6.2.2  Consumer protection .................................................................. 34 
6.2.3  Establishment and communication of clear guidelines .............. 35 
6.3  Responses to banks that are close to failure ...................................... 35 
6.4  Regulation responses from the top .................................................... 36 
7  Subprime mortgage crises ................................................. 38 
2 
7.1  Introduction ....................................................................................... 38 
7.2  Origins of the subprime mortgage market ......................................... 38 
7.3  Expansion of Subprime Lending ....................................................... 39 
7.4  Impact on the Financial Institutions .................................................. 41 
8  UBS ...................................................................................... 43 
8.1  History of UBS .................................................................................. 43 
8.2  Core Business .................................................................................... 44 
8.3  Development of Business in Recent Years ....................................... 44 
8.4  Loses and effects of the subprime mortgage crisis ............................ 44 
8.4.1  Market entry in to the US mortgage market 2007 ...................... 45 
8.5  Breakdown of the losses .................................................................... 46 
8.5.1  Measures taken after reviewed losses in 2007 ........................... 49 
8.6  Bailout plan UBS ............................................................................... 51 
8.7  Regulation response........................................................................... 52 
9  Citigroup ............................................................................. 53 
9.1  Introduction ....................................................................................... 53 
9.2  Subprime crises and its impact on the consumer business ................ 54 
9.3  Indicators of financial health ............................................................. 55 
9.4  Business growth and acquisitions ...................................................... 58 
9.5  Oversight and control ........................................................................ 59 
9.6  Off balance sheet vehicles and its impact on the overall performance
 60 
9.6.1  The role of CDO......................................................................... 66 
9.7  Bailout plan for Citigroup ................................................................. 69 
9.8  Aftermath for Citigroup ..................................................................... 71 
10  Conclusion ........................................................................... 73 
Appendix A - German Abstract ............................................... 76 
Appendix B - Curriculum Vitae .............................................. 77 
11  References ........................................................................... 79 
 
3 
List of Figures and Tables 
 
Figure 5.2: Residual risk .............................................................................. 32 
Figure 8.1: Net profit/loss attributed to the UBS shareholders .................... 47 
Figure 8.2: Income in the business area Investment Bank of UBS .............. 49 
Figure 9.1: Organizational structure of Citigroup ........................................ 53 
Figure 9.2: Net profit/loss Citigroup ............................................................ 61 
Figure 9.3: Median and average sales prices of new homes sold in United 
States (sales include the land) ...................................................................... 66 
Figure 9.4:Total issuance of CDOs .............................................................. 67 
Figure 9.5: Stock price Citigroup ................................................................. 69 
 
Table 3-1: Banking Regulation and Its Impact on the Financial System ..... 17 
Table 3-2: Financial help to Austrian banks in between 1925 – 1936 from 
the Austrian government .............................................................................. 20 
Table 9-1: Credit loss experience consumer & corporate business at 
Citigroup ...................................................................................................... 54 
Table 9-2: Assets by class- Citigroup .......................................................... 57 
Table 9-3: Assets by class - Bank of America ............................................. 57 
Table 9-4: Total issuance of CDOs by currency .......................................... 68 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 
List of Abbreviations 
 
ABS 
Alt-A 
CA 
CDO 
CDS 
EMEA 
FASB 
FICC 
GSE  
ICG 
QSPE 
SIV 
SPE 
SPV 
UBS 
VIE 
Asset-Backed Security 
Alternative A- paper 
Creditanstalt 
Collateral Debt Obligation 
Credit Default Swap 
Europe, Middle East and Africa countries 
Financial Accounting Standard Board  
Fixed Income, Currencies and Commodities Division 
Government Sponsored Enterprise 
Institutional Clients Group 
Qualifying Special Purpose Entity 
Structured Investment Vehicle 
Special Purpose Entity 
Special Purpose Vehicle 
Union Bank of Switzerland 
Variable Investment Entity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 
1 Introduction 
 
Bank failure is not a new subject in the economic literature. Past events 
like the great depression in 1930, failure of the Austrian Creditanstalt, 
Nordic Banking crises or the Asian crises in the nineties led to several 
bank failures that have shown that most of the cases of bank failures are 
closely connected with financial crises and in most cases cannot be seen as 
separated events.  
 
The recent experience of bank failure in the banking sector worldwide 
showed how the financial sector is unstable and prone to failure during a 
financial crisis. Surprisingly, also banks with long tradition and stable 
growing business were hit by the subprime mortgage crisis and needed to 
turn to governments for support and bail out options. 
 
In addition, this paper tries to identify the losses, the structure of the losses 
and the affects the subprime crisis had on the performance of the banks. 
Consequently, describes the actions that have been taken by these two 
banks UBS and Citigroup according to their problems. In addition it tries 
to explain and compare the role of regulators and their interventions 
before and during a banking crisis, previous and the current one. 
Comparison with the banking crises from the past allows identifying 
similarities and parallels.  
 
Why did I choose to analyze these two banks? In the first place they have 
been traditionally the leaders in the banking business. Past performance of 
the banks showed stable growth and outstanding profits. We can compare 
and learn from the different legal regulations, in Switzerland and the 
United States of America (USA), that have been applied in the two 
different systems of regulation to avoid future downturns. 
 
The thesis is structured as follows: In Chapter 2, the theory of economic 
crisis, financial crisis and bank failures are outlined. Chapter 3 deals with 
the previous major financial and banking crises and compares with the 
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present financial and housing market crisis that dominate the present, 
Chapter 4 looks into the issue of identifying the general differences, 
advantages and disadvantages of universal and separated banking systems, 
Chapter 5 outlines the key risk that financial institutions face , an area of 
extreme importance in terms of risk management, Chapter 6 gives details 
of the impact and the possibilities that the regulation has on the banks and 
the prevention of bank failure, Chapter 7 provides a detailed survey of the 
subprime mortgage crisis and its impact on financial institution. Chapter 8 
and 9 give a detailed overview of the performance and losses of UBS and 
Citigroup with regard to the subprime mortgage crisis and Chapter 10 
concludes. 
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2 Economic crises, financial crises and bank 
failures 
2.1 Bank Failure  
 
There are two ways how to look at a bank failure. On one hand we can 
assume that each crisis has the same symptoms and anatomy. The other 
view assumes that there exist wide differences between bank failures. Does 
each bank failure have particular features or is there a unique set of 
circumstances? 
As the reality is multidimensional the answer can be justified on the basis of 
the point of view or depth of perception. 
 
Bank failure is part of a financial crisis. It is important to understand that the 
banks do not fail only by the endogenous shocks or circumstances, but as 
part of the whole economy they are influenced by several exogenous macro 
or microeconomic forces.  
The most important thing is to think about bank failure not as a separated 
event; furthermore it almost always appears as part of a financial crisis. It is 
impossible to analyze bank failure without understanding the financial or 
economic crisis.  
 
The type of the exogenous or endogenous factor varies from one speculative 
boom to another. To list some, it may be the outbreak or an end of war, the 
widespread adoption of an invention (e.g. canals, rail roads, automobiles 
etc.), political events (change in political system, change of government 
etc.), debt conversion, government debt or asset market collapse just to 
name a few.  
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2.1.1 Position of a bank in a financial crisis 
 
According to Hyman Minsky, events that lead to a financial crisis start with 
displacements in the economic system. Sources that lead to changes in 
economic outlook open up new opportunities to profit in a sector of the 
economy. In the case of UBS and Citigroup it was the field of CDOs1. 
Displacement is especially important for banks. If they concentrate largely 
on one product or debt to a special sector, that does not have positive and 
growing economic outlook, it will be difficult for the financial institution to 
remain profitable.  
 
Displacement brings opportunities in some new or existing lines and 
diminishes others. As a consequence, business firms and individuals with 
savings or access to credit take advantage of the new opportunities. If the 
new opportunities dominate those that lose in importance, investment and 
production accelerate. In this situation, banks tend to expand credit and 
enlarge the total money supply. The money supply of the bank can be 
expanded whether by the issue of bank notes from the central bank that 
lends it to the commercial banks, or by borrowing in the form of additions to 
bank deposits. Credit remains risky and unstable. In case of monetary 
expansion and the following credit boom, risk rises and it is more difficult 
to control and to forecast the possible downturns. Increased demand for 
goods and financial assets makes price increase and attracts more investors 
and firms to new profit opportunities. At this stage of a boom part of the 
economy starts to speculate (buying for resale rather than use in the case of 
commodities, or for resale rather than income in case of financial assets). 
Velocity of circulation and prices continue to rise. 
At some point a few insiders decide to take their profits and sell out. Prices 
begin to level off, because no new participants are willing to move into 
speculation. The rush for liquidity (out of assets into money) leaves some 
speculative borrowers unable to pay off their loans leading to the increase of 
bankruptcies. 
 
                                                 
1 See chapter 9.3 for an overview on the role of Collateral Debt Obligations  
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Banks as the largest credit and loan providers feel the financial distress at 
first. At this point a bank might be in danger, depending how much of its 
assets were invested into the new sector and how it was leveraged with other 
assets and its deposits. If the leverage is not managed very well or the bank 
cannot rely on other financial sources, the bank might fail. A bank can look 
for other financial sources either to borrow from other banks or turn to the 
lender of last resort (in most cases government or the central bank). Lending 
from other banks is at this point usually very difficult as they might be also 
in distress and short on money. That is why there is in such a situation high 
pressure on the government or the central bank, lenders of last resort, to 
react and to make decisions which banks should be rescued and which 
should fail in order to stabilize the banking sector which is one of the 
important pillars of a healthy economy.  
2.1.2 Causalities of bank failure  
 
It is pure idealism to think that there is a manual, guidance, an instruction 
book, early warning signals to prevent bank failure. There is a full range of 
causalities and different combination of causes. Additional problems can be 
identified on the level of development of a financial market. Emerging 
market economies and developing countries tend to have different causes of 
bank failures than more established and more experienced financial systems, 
which have been already confronted with various misadventures and 
failures. Supervision and control is to the largest part formed by experience 
and the aftermath which is turned into learning experience and is then 
transformed into a legal framework. Nevertheless there are some factors 
which occur repetitively in different variations: 
 
a) Incompetent banking 
b) Inadequate market discipline 
c) Weak banking legislation and supervision 
d) Inadequate macro policies  
 
a) Incompetent banking 
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Poor lending practices, excessive risk taking, poor governance, poor risk 
management system, lack of internal control, focus on market share rather 
than on profitability, currency and maturity mismatches in the bank itself, or 
the borrowers etc.  
Moral hazard of bank managers, whose personal responsibility is not 
adequate to the excessive risk that they are taking, is always present in a 
financial crisis or a bank failure. The main implication of moral hazard is 
that the negative development in profitability does not lead financial 
intermediaries to be more cautious in risk taking in lending, and to allow 
financial strategies reducing the overall riskiness of their portfolios. In the 
case of UBS and Citigroup the moral hazard played a great role. The 
investment banking business which bears high risks has not been adequately 
governed. The incentives were too great for the managers. Instead of the 
quality of the investments, quantity was the goal for the managers, because 
they were remunerated by the fees. This was not leading to a sustainable 
development. 
 
b) Inadequate market discipline 
Transparency and disclosure are key factors for the exertion of discipline by 
the creditors on the bank managers or owners. Proper auditing and 
accounting practices, collateral valuation methods are necessary for passing 
on information about the capital adequacy. 
 
c) Weak regulatory and supervision framework 
 
Each financial system needs sufficient, well qualified and trained staff. 
Since authority is responsible for supervision and early identification of 
possible threats. It is of high importance to construct a legal, judicial and 
institutional framework that enables competent supervision.  
 
d) Macro policies and macroeconomic developments 
 
Not all of the macroeconomic controls can be regulated by the authorities, 
especially not in the interlinked internationalized markets. 
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Lending booms, excessive capital inflows or outflows, real estate equity 
price bubbles, slowdown of export or growth, reduction of export markets or 
shrinking of domestic markets due to competition or changes in the structure 
of market, growing excess capacity or falling profitability in real sector, 
lower overall investment, rising fiscal and or current account deficits, 
weakened public debt sustainability, sharp changes in exchange rates and 
real interest rates, etc.2, just to name few. All these factors can have direct or 
indirect impact on the performance of the bank; therefore, banks need to 
monitor all these factors. Consequently, they have the opportunity to adjust 
continuously all the time to macro policies or macroeconomic development 
and implement ongoing changes. The dangers and the chances lie within the 
adaptability of a financial institution.  
 
2.1.3 Early warnings of banking crises  
 
As mentioned before, banking crises are in most of the cases present during 
financial crises. Of course, banking crises can also occur without 
endogenous factors, but these cases do not appear to be very common. More 
significantly, if just one or two banks are close to a failure, within good 
working financial systems the bailout or other restructuring can be applied 
and executed very easily.  
According to the Aftermath of financial crises by Reinhart and Rogoff, who 
compared the banking crises world wide and extended their research with 
the newest ongoing, the following similar indications of banking and 
financial crises could be identified: 
 
There are similar patterns in macroeconomic indicators such as housing and 
equity prices, unemployment, government revenues and debts. 
 
 Asset market collapses are deep and prolonged 
 
                                                 
2 Ingves, S., (2002) 
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Real housing prices decline 35 per cent at average, stretched out over six 
years, while equity prices collapse 55 per cent at average over a 
downturn of about three and a half years.3 
 
 Declines in output and employment 
 
The unemployment rate rose on average by 7 percentage points over the 
down phase of the cycle, which lasts on average over for years. Output 
falls (from peak to trough) on average by 9 per cent, although the 
duration of the downturn, averaging roughly two years, is considerably 
shorter than for unemployment.4 
 
 Real value of the government debt tends to explode 
 
In the post World War II period, the government debt rose on average 
by 86 per cent. The main causes of the debt are not widely cited costs of 
bailing out and recapitalizing the banking system. Bailing out costs are 
difficult to measure but even the estimates from competing studies do 
not show comparable high numbers on the amount of public debt that is 
dedicated just to the bailing out of financial institutions.   
 
                                                 
3 Reinhart, M., Rogoff, S., (2008) 
4 Ibid. 
13 
3 Historical comparison 
 
The comparison with the Asian, Latin American or Russian crises is not 
applicable to such an extent as with the Great Depression and the Nordic 
banking crises. 
Emerged and developing countries tend to have different risk concerning 
bank failure. In developing countries the financial system is weak and does 
not provide as much legal framework compared to experienced and more 
capitalized markets. A special feature of the developing and emerging 
banking crises is the high threat of moral hazard. Due to the lack of a strong 
legal framework and enforcement moral hazard is crucial to bank failure. 
These could be observed for example in the Asian5 and Russian 19986 
banking crises. 
One of the main problems in the Latin American countries is the fragility of 
the financial systems. Even relatively mild shocks to the banking industry 
can quickly result in sharp reduction of the deposit base.7 This is a large 
difference to the more developed financial systems in countries where UBS 
and Citigroup are settled in.  
Due to the large differences in the level of development of the financial 
sectors and the factors that have triggered the downturns within many 
financial and banking crises that have occurred in the past we select these 
crises which have related environments and causes. The best examples for 
comparison can be found analysing the crises in the USA in the 1930s, the 
Nordic banking crises of early 1990s, and the Credit-Anstalt (CA) crises of 
1931. 
3.1 The Great Depression of the 1930s 
 
Similar causes of the downturn between the depression in the thirties and 
the financial crisis of 2008 can be identified as followed: in an economic 
crisis the chronology of reaction is being started with the contraction of 
                                                 
5 Corsetti, G., Pesenti, P., Roubini N, (1999) 
6 Styrin, K.A. (2005) 
7 Hausmann, R., Rojas-Suárez L., (1996) 
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production, secondly financial markets react (widespread bank failures) 
followed by rise in unemployment. 
Compared to the great depression of the thirties the magnitude of the effects 
on the economy today is not as large as then.  
 
The great depression was similar to the financial crisis of 2008 also as to the 
international aspects. Not just the American market was in crisis but the 
impact of the downturn was observable also in other parts of the world as 
Europe or South America. 
 
 Failure of financial institutions  
 
In the 1930s the collapse in production and wealth led to bankruptcies 
and the decline of the number of banks in the United States from 26,751 
in December 1926 to the low point of a total number of 14,440 of banks 
in December 1933.8 Nearly half of American financial institutions 
disappeared. In between October 2002 and October 2009 the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Company registered 149 failed banks.9 
One can assume that not appropriately managed banks in the United 
States did already fail in between the years 1926 and 1933; therefore 
such a vast number of failures should be not observable anymore. 
On the other hand if all the bad managed banks have already failed the 
regulators would have to learn from the previous mismanagement, and 
supervising authorities should be able to create a legal framework that 
would early enough identify unhealthy banks, and what is more 
important, make it possible to intervene to prevent further damage in 
identified banks. Not only the possible threats to the depositors and 
investors matter, one has also to prevent the possible spread of a bank 
run. 
 
                                                 
8 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (1943) 
9 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (2009) , 
http://www.fdic.gov/bank/individual/failed/banklist.html 
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 Consumers and business cut down their investments and turn heavily 
to saving. In October US consumer spending fell by 1per cent, the 
largest decline since 2001.10 
 
 Rise in unemployment  
 
While in the 1930s unemployment reached nearly 25 per cent11, the 
unemployment rate in the USA rose from 4.4 per cent in March 2007 to 
9.4 per cent in July 2009. Since the recession began in December 2007, 
5.1 million jobs have been lost, with almost two-thirds (3.3 million) of 
the decrease occurring in the last 5 months up to July 2009. Job losses 
are large and widespread across the major industry sectors.12 
 
 International magnitude of the crisis today and in the 1930s  
 
The contraction in production and the changes of the unemployment rate 
have a major impact on the whole national economy. Chances that the 
recovery could be supported by worldwide demand are not very high 
and optimistic. During the a few past months the fall in demand for 
consumption and the employment decrease has spread also to Europe 
and Asia.  
 
The greatest difference in comparison to the great depression was the way 
how the government was viewing banks and dealing with the weakened 
banks. Franklin Roosevelt let the banks fail, nowadays the preference of the 
government is to prevent large banking houses from failing and to bail them 
out by injecting money. The reason to do so is to protect the overall stability 
and prevent further bank runs. In the 1930s the FED thought weak banks 
should fail. Borrowers suffer during deflation because their debts are fixed 
in value, but creditors benefit because the dollars they get back will buy 
more. Debts cannot adjust to the falling prices because interest rates cannot 
go below zero. 
                                                 
10 Big Drops in US consumer Spending, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/7750465.stm 
[May 5, 2009] 
11 Bureau of Economic Analysis 
http://www.bea.gov/national/nipaweb/SelectTable.asp?Selected=Y,Table1.1.3 [June, 2009] 
12 Bureau of Labor Statistics, http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/empsit.pdf [April 3, 
2009] 
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The other aspect to the bail out of the banks is the responsibility for the risk 
that has been taken. If the future, management of an important bank can 
count on the alternative that in case of a bank failure the government or the 
central bank as a lender of the last resort is going to intervene, it will act 
much more risk friendly. These individuals in the management might be 
more inclined to lend more money to projects with higher or not predictable 
risk with the knowledge that they will not have to bee taken into account for 
failure in the future.  
3.2 Nordic Banking Crises of the 1990s 
 
The Nordic banking crises of the early 1990 were the first systematic crises 
in industrialized countries since the 1930s, if the banking problems directly 
related to the devastation of the Second World War are excluded. 13 
In the Nordic countries economies and financial systems were well 
organized. So how could such problems occur? 
 
The causes presented in the introduction can be found also to different 
degree in the Nordic banking crises. But compared to the other crises Nordic 
countries are usually well developed at the micro level compared to 
emerging markets and developing economies e.g. Argentina or some Asian 
countries. This environment is almost ideal for crisis management and bank 
resolution. If the microeconomic structure is in place, even in turbulent 
times it is not necessary to provide a systematic resolution framework or a 
regulatory framework for dealing with problematic banks. It was relatively 
easy to take over and recapitalize a bank, lend or guarantee funds to a 
private bank, set up limited liability companies for dealing with problematic 
assets –transactions that have been proven extraordinarily difficult in many 
other countries.14 The table 3-1 below gives an overview of the regulations 
that have been introduced in the Scandinavian countries and the effects that 
occurred after their implementation. 
 
 
                                                 
13 Ingves, S., (2002) 
14 Ibid. 
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Regulation Effects 
Interest rate regulations Limited price competition 
Lending rates were controlled and were 
tied to money market and/or central bank 
base rate (changed infrequently). 
  
Deposit rates were linked to the base 
rate in Finland, but not in Norway and 
Sweden. 
Led to competitive advantage of banks 
vis-à-vis other financial institutions in 
Finland, as only banks were allowed to   
issue tax-exempt deposits.         
Quantitative restrictions Promoted extensive branch networks. 
  
  
  
Reserve requirements 
Funding quotas from central bank 
Direct credit ceiling 
Liquidity ratios (bond investment 
obligations) 
Shifted portfolio compositions of banks 
in favour of government and housing bonds 
rather than loans to private  
Controls on capital flows Prevented banks from resorting to foreign 
funds. 
Prudential regulations   
No strict enforcement of capital 
adequacy requirements. 
Banks held low equity capital. 
No regulations on cross ownership 
between financial and nonfinancial 
institutions. 
Led to holdings of direct equity stakes in 
nonfinancial companies by foreign banks. 
Other   
Foreign banks were not allowed to 
establish subsidiaries. 
Prevented competition by foreign banks. 
Table 3-1: Banking Regulation and Its Impact on the Financial System15 
 
Historic parallels between UBS and Citigroup can be found with the crises 
in the Nordic countries in the 1980s. To compare the UBS and Citigroup 
failure we need a comparable industry environment. As a matter of course, 
there are similar factors which can lead to a bank failure as in emerging and 
developing countries but in our case it is much clearer and better to compare 
UBS and Citigroup with bank crises at the same level of industry 
development.  
The Nordic banking crises and the bank failure of UBS and Citigroup have 
many things in common. 
 
 Industrial countries with a strong financial system 
 
 Both went through a period of market deregulation 
 
                                                 
15 Drees, B. , Pazarbasioglu, C., (1998) 
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 Removal of restrictions on capital movements and economic 
deregulation  
 
o In the case of Nordic banks it was the change of the lending 
rate regulations. More precisely, during the 1980s explicit 
limits of average lending rates were imposed in Norway, 
Finland and Sweden. Nevertheless, loan rates did not 
primarily reflect the perceived credit risk of the borrower, but 
instead depended largely on the closeness of the borrower’s 
relationship with the bank.16  
 
o Similarly, for UBS and Cititgroup an important role played 
the changes in the American financial market. More precisely 
it was the deregulation of capital requirements. In 2004 the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) removed rules 
that hold leverage at 15 to 1 for investment banking 
companies.17 These changes allowed the management of the 
banks to shift the leverage and by the shift; banks find 
themselves more vulnerable to default. Repeal of the Glass-
Steagall Act of 1933 in 1999, which separated banks 
according to their business into commercial or business 
banks, allowed Citigroup to get involved into investment 
banking and merge with Travelers insurance group.  
 
 Financial innovation (in case of UBS and Citigroup Collateral Debt 
Obligations, more details in the chapter under 9.4.1) 
 Increased competition in financial services 
 Unfavourable economic development 
 Delayed policy responses 
 Banks inadequate internal risk-management controls 
 
 
                                                 
16 Drees, B., Pazarbasioglu, C., (1998) 
17 Gandel, S., (2009) 
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A banking crisis in the aftermath of financial liberalization does not 
automatically imply that the crisis was caused by the deregulation. In the 
Nordic case it was deregulation in combination with significant domestic 
overheating, declines in income, unfavourable macroeconomic 
developments and depressed asset markets.18 
 
3.3 The Crisis of the Austrian Creditanstalt 1931 
 
The crash of the Austrian Creditanstalt in 1931 might bear comparison to 
the subprime mortgage crisis of 2006. The world and the level of 
development in the financial sector of 1929 were in many respects different 
but there are many similarities to present world situation. 
Collapse of Creditanstalt happened also due to the worldwide crises that had 
its origin in the American market. The depression spread from the USA 
worldwide and Creditanstalt experienced the first European bank run in 
1931. But the depression was not the only factor. Problems originated 
already from several sources: 
 
 The dismemberment of the Habsburg Empire in 1919 after the 
Treaty of Trianon 
 Post-war inflation 
 The League of Nations stabilisation with its 1922 protocol that 
required League approval for Austrian borrowing and any departure 
from gold 
 Austrian bank and speculators participation in the 1924 attack on the 
French franc that produced thirty bank failures in Austria  
 The failure of the Bodenkreditanstalt in 1929 and its absorption by 
Creditanstalt, without adequate provision for its bad loans19 
 
All these factors contributed also to the failure. The management of the 
Creditanstalt claimed that it was initially unaware of the real extant of the 
losses of the Bodencreditanstalt, Austria’s second largest bank, which only 
                                                 
18 Drees, B. , Pazarbasioglu, C., (1998) 
19 Good, D., (1993) 
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emerged in 1931.20 The newest research work found out that an intricate 
system of cross-deposits was set up by the Austrian Central Bank covertly 
to direct funds to the Creditanstalt via American and British banks to 
compensate it for taking over the bankrupt Bodencreditanstalt, suggesting 
that the received accounts of the collapse of the Creditanstalt need to be 
revised.21 
 
The similarities that can be observed on both sides between present US 
banks and the Creditanstalt are the huge losses that have been made public 
in their balance sheets. For both banks the CA and Citigroup the real losses 
were much higher than expected. Also as in the case of Citigroup the 
National Bank of Austria helped the CA when the first liquidity problems 
occurred. Nevertheless, this fund injection of a total of 708 million 
Schillings still could not help to restructure its balance sheet. At the end CA 
has lost 1,068 million Schillings in total. Analogous to the problems of UBS 
and Citigroup, CA crisis can not be viewed as an isolated event. It was a 
central occurrence of the Austrian bank crisis between 1925 and 1936. All 
in all, Austrian government and the Austrian National Bank spent 1,137 
million Schillings during the bank crisis in the period between the First 
World War and the Second World War on Austrian banks. For a detailed 
breakdown see table below. 
 
Postal Savings Bank 200 Million Schilling 
Central bank of the German Savings Bank 80 Million Schilling 
Credit Anstalt 708 Millions Schilling 
Viennese Association of Banks 55 Million Schilling 
Lower Austrian Escompte Company 94 Million Schilling 
Total 1137 Million Schilling 
Table 3-2: Financial help to Austrian banks in between 1925 – 1936 from the Austrian 
government22 
 
                                                 
20 Aguado, I., (2001) 
21 Ibid. 
22 Stiefel, D., (1989) 
21 
The communication of the losses to the public played a pivotal role. Similar 
to the CA, Citigroup was trying to procrastinate to report losses in order to 
win time to look and find other financial source to cover up for the losses 
that have been made or the credit losses that were close to default.  
Time plays a very important role in the financial world. Sensitive 
information had and still has an immediate impact on the stock prices and 
ratings. 
 
In both cases the total amount of the write-down has been visible after the 
peak of the financial crises, but only two or three years. 
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4 Universal and separated banking system  
 
It is important to understand and examine two cases of the banking system. 
This will show the advantages and disadvantages of both types of banking a 
universal and a separated banking system. Later on the example of UBS 
which is a European, Swiss bank and Citigroup a traditional American 
banking group, we can observe and compare possible advantages in 
handling risk.  
 
This distinction in two banking business models does exist solely in the 
USA. This specification is based on the Glass-Steagall Act from 1933, 
which created separated banking systems. The aim of the act was to prevent 
commercial and investment banks from operating as a single institution. 
Nevertheless due to the Economic Crisis in 2008 the universal banking 
system might once more change or will be adjusted to the aftermath and 
causes of the crisis.  
 
There are certainly advantages and disadvantages to both systems the 
universal and the separated banking system. Following arguments are as 
listed below. 
 
Arguments for a separated banking system: 
 
 Commercial banking is less risky than investment banking; therefore 
a separated banking system secures the deposits of the bank 
depositors in a better way than the universal bank. 
 Commercial banks in the separated banking system do have access 
to cheap deposits. With the introduction of a universal banking 
system, this would create an unfair advantage over investment 
banks. 
 Existing conflict between granting loans and emission back up can 
be solved in case of separated banking system via competition. 
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 Universal banks have the possibility to replace poor credits by bonds 
which are placed in the market to detach their credits. 
 
Arguments against a separated banking system:  
 
 Due to the new financial products and internationalization the 
banking sector cannot keep up with the separated system. 
 Competition in the field of emission is much wider, if the emission is 
not restricted just to a group of banks.  
 Balance of risk can be managed better in a universal bank. 
 Universal banks posses better subvention opportunities (temporarily) 
to unprofitable or failed banking transactions or operations. 
 A separated system is not efficient, because no matter whether it is a 
commercial or an investment bank, both have to enforce credit 
ratings. 
 
Now a day in the internationalized financial environment the banking 
regulatory systems cannot control a bank in its foreign activities. After the 
tremendous losses accounted for Citigroup, the management of the company 
decided to separate again the banking system not to cumulate the risk. In 
this case a company has more oversight and can better control the risk. For 
Citigroup universal banking might not be the right way to unwind risk 
management. Therefore a separated banking system might prevent or at 
least reduce the losses it had to account for in 2008 and 2009.  
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5 Types of key risks in a financial institution 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
Banks and  other financial service  companies  are seen as  conservative 
risk-averse organizations. In reality, nothing could be further from the truth. 
The core business of banks consists of seeking opportunities where the 
market price for accepting risk is higher than their own assessment of its 
likely costs. There are many ways to look at the different risks. Different 
literature sources list various risks and also the definitions vary. As an 
example:  
 
 Credit risk  
Failure of the counterparty to meet its obligations. 
 
 Market risk  
Risk that the prices of financial instruments, such as equities in 
which a bank has positions, falls. 
 
 Interest rate risk  
In bank balance sheets assets and liabilities are listed with fixed or 
floating rates which do change continually over time. A bank makes 
a lot of fixed rate loans (e.g. car loans, equipment loans) funded with 
floating rate deposits. It is exposed to the risk that interest rates rise. 
This will push up costs of funds while the returns on its assets will 
remain largely unchanged.23 
 
 Operational risk I 
It is challenging to find a simple definition of operational risk. Many 
different approaches can be found in literature. The Basel Accord 
                                                 
23 Frost, S., (2004) 
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defines it as risk arising from execution of a company's business 
functions. 
 
 Foreign currency risk  
Foreign bank that borrows in home currency is exposed to exchange 
risk. The main risk is that home currency appreciates against local 
currency leaving it with a liability that in local currency terms is 
greater than the value of its matching assets. 
 
 Liquidity risk 
Banks are usually funded with relatively little liquidity, with short-
term deposits which are lent out long term as loans. Loans are 
inherently illiquid. Companies and individuals rarely borrow unless 
they have a financing need. Banks face the risk that a large portion 
of their depositors will demand their funds back at the same time. 
Management has to determine the appropriate balance between 
holding low yield, but liquid assets such as government securities 
that can be readily sold and higher yielding, but illiquid assets such 
as loans. 
 
 Model risk  
Banks use models to estimate the value of diverse instruments and to 
assess the level of risk that the bank is exposed to in its trading 
activities. These models are complex and errors in these models pose 
a risk to banks. They overpay financial instruments or underestimate 
the level of market or trading risk being taken. 
 
 Regulatory risk  
Banks are highly regulated organizations. They are at risk from 
regulatory and legislative changes that increase the costs of doing 
their business and may even prohibit them from undertaking it at all. 
26 
They may breach regulatory requirements and be fined, finally 
losing their license or suffer loss of reputation.24 
 
 Country risk  
A bank with operations in a foreign country is, for example, at risk 
from the impositions of capital controls preventing it from remitting 
any profits or other funds it has in that country. In extreme cases 
foreign banks may even have their assets appropriated. 
 
We could list many more problems, depending on the view and the 
categories (e.g. actuarial risk, performance risk, political risk, replacement 
risk, settlement risk, judicial and legal risk etc.). Many of the risks do 
overlap or influence each other to a high extent. Therefore, it is important to 
keep focus on the ones which cause the highest losses or are difficult to 
measure.  
The most common primary cause of bank failures is insolvency arising from 
credit losses. This is followed by failure to manage interest rate risk and 
foreign exchange risk. Failure arising from operational risk (e.g. fraud), 
market risk, and liquidity risk tend to be more visible by press monitoring 
and are more severe but the first two factors are more common.  
 
5.2 Credit Risk  
 
Credit risk is the first of all listed risks in terms of importance. Risk 
characteristics differentiate debtors; a small manufacturing company is 
differently exposed than a large one. The challenge for the bank is to 
determinate a pricing structure for its products that is competitive but 
compensates for the underlying risks. 
The major source of risk is the default risk of customers. Counterparty that 
owes or potentially owes bank, can fail to meet its obligations. They might 
fully or just partly fail to comply with their obligations to service debt. 
Default might also increase, when the risk of a decline in the credit standing 
of an issuer becomes higher. Deterioration of credit standing of a borrower 
                                                 
24 Frost, S. (2004) 
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does materialize into loss because it causes an upward move of the market 
yield to compensate the higher risk and triggers a value decline. The view of 
credit risk differs for the banking and the trading portfolio.  
 
Banking Portfolio  
Credit risk is critical since the default25 of a small number of important 
customers can generate large losses, potentially leading to bankruptcy or 
insolvency. Simple payment delays do not count automatically as default; 
many are resolved within a short period of time. Credit risk is difficult to 
quantify when using the ex ante data, because of the necessary assessment 
of the likelihood of a default event and of the recoveries under default, 
which depend on the context. Context refers to all factors influencing loss 
under default, such as the outstanding balance of debt at default, the 
existence of guarantees, or the policy of all stakeholders with respect to the 
debt.  
Various default possibilities: 
o Delay in payment obligations 
o Restructuring of debt obligations due to major deterioration of 
the credit standing of the borrower  
o Bankruptcies  
 
Trading Portfolio  
In contrast to loans the credit risk of traded debts is also indicated by the 
agencies’ ratings, assessing the quality of public debt issues, or through 
changes of the value of their stocks. Credit risk is also visible through credit 
spreads, the add-ons to the risk-free rate defining the required market risk 
yield of debts. The capability of trading market assets mitigates the credit 
risk since there is no need to hold these securities until the deterioration of 
credit risk materializes into effective losses.26 
 
 
                                                 
25 This means any situation other than a simple delinquency. 
26 Bessin, Joël, (2002) 
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5.3 Market Risk 
 
5.3.1 Definition 
Market risk is an adverse deviation of value during a certain liquidation 
period. Tradable assets have random variations. Their distribution results 
from observable sensitivities of instruments and volatilities of market 
parameters. Depending on the market factors we can distinguish between: 
 
 Equity risk (change in stock prices) 
 Interest rate risk (change in interest rate ) 
 Currency risk (foreign exchange risk)  
 Commodity risk ( change in the price of commodities e.g. metal, oil, 
agricultural products) 
 
To define the potential adverse deviation of the portfolios market value 
mathematical models are needed. The VaR methodology captures the 
maximum adverse deviation of prices during a preset period for liquidating 
assets, considering the changes in the market parameters.  
Controlling market risk means keeping the variations of the value of a given 
portfolio within given boundary values through putting upper  limits on 
imposed risk, and hedging for isolating portfolio from the uncontrollable 
market movements.27  
 
5.4 Operational Risk 
 
Operational risk management has its origin in the military and nuclear 
technology. The operational risk is a not negligible factor. In the financial 
services sector it is far higher than the market risk for most banks, and thus 
it is the second biggest risk category after credit risk.28  
Risk and hazard is involved in the operations of most of the enterprises, but 
banks are an exception. The position as a borrower and lender in its 
intermediary function has a central role in the whole economy and society. 
                                                 
27 Bessin, Joël , (2002) 
28 OeNB and FMA , (2006) p.7 
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Therefore, misjudgement of risk, incompetency, fraud, criminal tendencies, 
unavailability or loss of employees, diverse process mistakes (account 
entries, settlement, valuation etc.) and failure of technical systems represent 
potential causes of failure. All these examples are internal effects, but bank 
is interacting to a high level with other entities and actions of these can be 
also source of potential damages to the financial institution. For example 
external effects like violence, crime, white collar crime, physical threats, 
natural disaster, legal risk or political changes can trigger operational risk.  
The potential can be multiplied by the complexity of banking, expanding 
into new markets and changing business activities, progressive and fast 
growing internationalization, implementation of automatic information 
technologies, and last but not least introduction of new more complex 
financial products.  
5.4.1 Definition of Operational risk 
 
It is of a great importance to understand and analyze operational risk, 
because it is one of the key factors that have contributed to the default and 
losses in the example of the two major banks UBS and Citigroup.  
Operational risk should not be mixed up with risks of operations. Being the 
risks of errors appearing in complex systems and processes, it is a subset of 
operational risk. Operations risk does not include fraud, model or serial risks 
(legal risk). In the broader sense we understand under operational29 risk all 
the potential losses associated with operating  
 
Operational risk exists as soon as a company uses employees or systems in 
processes or is subject to external interaction. Naturally, this evolves long 
before the credit and market risk are present or can be evaluated. After all, it 
is not the consequence but the cause of a loss event that, by definition, 
determine weather it is an event of operational loss. Operational risks can 
appear directly or indirectly through a market or credit risk at different 
levels: 
 
                                                 
29 From Latin operare = work, operate, create. 
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 People 
 Processes 
 Technical equipment 
 Information technology 
 
People risk is designated by human errors, lack of experience or expertise, 
fraud, lack of compliance with existing procedures and policies. 
 
 Inadequate procedures and controls for reporting, monitoring and 
decision making 
 Inadequate procedures on processing information, such as errors in 
booking transactions and failure to examine legal documentation 
 Organizational differences  
 Risk surveillance and excess limits: management deficiencies in risk 
monitoring, such as not providing the right incentives to report risk , 
or not abiding by the procedure and policies in force  
 Errors in the recording process of transactions 
 The technical deficiencies of the information system or the risk 
measures  
 
As experience made in the past fifteen years show, operational risks are a 
major source of financial loss in the banking sector. If we examine closer 
the past cases of failure, a significant share of loss events recorded by banks 
that are attributed to market or credit risk are actually at least related to 
operational risk.  
 
 
5.4.2 Operational Risk under the Basel Accord 
 
According to the first Basel Accord operational risk is defined as residual 
risk, when credit risk and market risk are excluded from the business risk of 
a bank. 
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According to this definition, business risk includes operational risk although 
it constitutes the enterprises risk of management decisions and, therefore, is 
beyond risk manager’s control and competences.30 
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 31 is advocating more focus 
on the operational risk in banks by imposing a regulatory charge for other 
risks. The reason behind this regulation is that in fact the capital, held as a 
cushion against residual risks, including operational risk, was increasingly 
reduced by the more sophisticated and accurate measurement of credit risk.  
This was also one the reason why the Basel Committee specified operational 
risk further. In the year 2001 the definition focused on the causes of 
(potential) loss events in order to differentiate operational losses from 
events falling in other categories: 
 
“Operational risk is defined as the risk of loss resulting from inadequate or 
failed internal processes, people and systems or from external events. This 
definition includes legal risk, but excludes strategic and reputational risk.” 
 
                                                 
30OeNB and FMA (2006) 
31 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (1999) 
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Under residual risks we can mention strategic or reputational risk.  
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6 Theory of Regulation 
6.1 Introduction 
 
The banking sector is compared to other commercial sectors heavily 
regulated. A set of regulations accompanies a bank from the formation of a 
company to the point of close down. In some countries banks and financial 
institutions are being supervised and control led by more than just one body, 
each one responsible for regulation and supervision of a particular segment 
of financial services. The regulation varies from country to country but 
mostly it is divided between commercial banking, the securities business 
(investment banks, brokers and fund managers) and insurance companies 
(both life and non-life).32 
Other parties such as accounting standards bodies and auditors also have an 
important role to present financial transactions and ensure the accuracy of 
data released by the companies. 
 
Bank crises are closely related with equity losses. Since the state usually 
cannot evade his responsibility as the “lender of last resort “, it is highly 
interested to avoid or to mitigate bank crises.  
 
Regulation is a contaminant in a free market, which is based on the idea and 
interaction of market forces. The theory of perfect markets is based on the 
combination of particular market actors. Their aspiration towards individual 
returns and benefit maximization leads at the same time to publicly efficient 
resource allocation. In practice, markets are not perfect but that does not 
mean that regulation is necessary.  
6.2 Main subjects of regulation 
 
More important is who we want to favour or protect through the regulation. 
Primary objectives are maintenance of a safe and sound financial system, 
consumer protection and to establish and communicate clear guidelines. 
                                                 
32 Frost, S., (2004) 
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6.2.1 Maintain safe and sound financial system  
 
The passive potential of banks for money generation has a great influence 
on the money supply in the economy and therefore also on price stability. 
Both of these factors would be without regulation subject to high 
fluctuation. This is directly unfavourable for the stability of the economy 
and the overall development.  
The threatening or incurred instability can easily lead to loss of assurance of 
the deposits’ security. Eventually this can cause a bank run, first few banks 
collapse, than like a domino effect the whole banking system is engaged. A 
breakdown of the banking system leads not just to loss of capital but in most 
cases also the state is involved and is urged to take part. As an example the 
bank crises in Norway cost the state in the beginning of the 90ties $16 
billions, The US government spent in 2009 as much as $2.5 trillion - $350 
billion33, Swiss National Bank agreed to inject $5.23 billion34  and UK 
government committed up to £50 billion of taxpayer funds for a partial 
nationalisation of stricken banks.35 
Also in the case of one bank downturn the state cannot entirely avoid not to 
be involved. This is the case of large banks that are far too important and 
“too big to fail”. This applies to Citibank and UBS, two worldwide largest 
banks.  
 
6.2.2 Consumer protection 
 
Consumer protection from abuse by financial institutions ensures that they 
are treated in a fair way. There is clearly the need for protection of 
depositors, because on average they do not posses the knowledge and the 
information of the complicated and interwoven financial service, complex 
                                                 
33 Calmes J., Revised U.S. bank bailout plan gets lukewarm reception, (February 11, 2009), 
The New York Times, http://www.iht.com/articles/2009/02/11/business/geithner.php 
[March 13, 2009] 
34 Swissinfo.ch, Swiss bank bailout announced, (October 16, 2008), 
http://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/specials/finance_crisis/Swiss_bank_bailout_plan_announced.
html?siteSect=23451&sid=9853818&cKey=1227790179000&ty=st  [May 25, 2009] 
35Naughton, P., Brown and Darling commit £500 billion for bank bailout, (October 8, 
2008), Times Online,  
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article4905637.ece [May 20, 2009] 
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contract relations and institutions. Naturally the depositors can protect 
themselves by using other bank houses or keep the savings at home, but in 
this case the economic efficiency that results from the financial relations 
would not take place. Protection of creditors does not mean the protection of 
the deposits at any costs. Rather the unobstructed unwinding of financial 
business between the institutions and the customers should be encouraged. 
6.2.3 Establishment and communication of clear 
guidelines 
 
In order to ensure that the safe and sound financial system can be 
maintained and at the same time consumer protection is ensured, financial 
institutions implement and follow the rules that should ensure it is crucial to 
establish and communicate clear guidelines and procedures. 
 
Regulation is not the cure for all mismanagement and will also not secure a 
fair treatment for all the parties. Legislators and regulatory authorities are 
not at all times omniscient and benevolent. Moreover, they are not that well 
informed about the situation and the actual problems that need to be given 
attention to. The subject of the regulation and the information asymmetry 
often leads to not compatible goals of the regulators and the good of public 
benefit. On one hand we face the failure of the market and on the other hand 
the failure of the government administration.  
 
6.3 Responses to banks that are close to failure 
 
During the collapse of the financial system central bank and the government 
should try to stabilize the economic environment to prevent much deeper 
depression.  
 
People tend to react in crises typically with a follower approach. Media and 
news play a pivotal role in the reaction that the public will exercise to 
prevent their savings or investments to devalue. The worst case for the 
central bank and the government is a bank run. Depositors are afraid and 
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want to switch and withdraw their money or relocate to different products. 
In this case even a relatively healthy bank can cause distress or a failure.  
 
6.4 Regulation responses from the top 
 
The regulation can try to minimise the systematic risk to which all the 
banking institutions are exposed. They can try to avoid a bank run, which 
destabilizes the bank and can cause its bankruptcy. If this is the case for 
more banks, as it usually is, this can lead to much larger and more sever 
financial crises followed by economic depression. Protection can be 
achieved by the following instruments used by the regulators and 
government. These instruments can be distinguished into two groups, based 
on the time the action is taken: 
 
Ex ante action 
 Equity requirements  
 Posting reserve ratio requirements  
 Regular reporting  
 Audit by the governmental agencies 
 
Ex post action 
 Temporary suspension of withdrawals 
 Protection of  deposit insurance systems 36 
 Additional financial injection, taking a stake in the vulnerable 
institution 
 Central bank or government acts as a lender of last resort, 
allowing short term loans to banks (in this case it is not 
absolutely sure if the change in the money multiplier will also 
enhance the cash flow. The idea is to deliver more money into 
the system but other scenarios exist. If the banks hold the money 
as reserves which were intentionally determined for the public, 
the effect will not be the outcome that the initiators planned. 
                                                 
36 For example the U.S. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
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Volume and size stay crucial to monetary regulations and 
interventions. Without a clear framework and the cooperation of 
the financial institution the effectiveness of interventions will be 
much more unpredictable and difficult to maintain.) 
 
The policies that can be applied to assure best practice remain still 
problematic. As we can see from the current and previous events, so far 
none of these actions could prevent the economic downturn.  
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7 Subprime mortgage crises 
7.1 Introduction 
 
The subprime mortgage crises which caused the ongoing financial crises 
worldwide in 2007 have their origin in the US. They started with a dramatic 
rise in mortgage delinquencies, foreclosures, bankruptcy of numerous 
mortgage companies, and a significant tightening in subprime lending 
standards with major consequences for the worldwide banking systems and 
financial markets.  
7.2 Origins of the subprime mortgage market 
 
About 20 per cent37 of mortgages issued in the US in 2006, were made to 
subprime borrowers.  
Subprime lending is lending of cash to clients who have very poor or no 
credit history at higher than normal repayment level. Subprime mortgages 
are residential loans that do not conform to the criteria for prime mortgages. 
Other than prime mortgages, subprime mortgages have a lower expected 
probability of full repayment. The probability of full repayment is assessed 
usually according to the borrowers’ credit record and score. These are 
represented by the debt service-to-income ratio (DTI), or the mortgage loan-
to-value ratio. Borrowers with low credit scores, debt service-to-income 
level above 55 per cent, or mortgage loan-to-value over 85 per cent are 
likely to be considered subprime. Alternative A paper loans (Alt-A) fall into 
grey area between prime and subprime mortgages. These began as more 
flexible alternative prime loans, mainly for borrowers who met all of the 
credit score, DTI and LTV prime criteria, but did not provide full 
documentation or more investment properties.38  
  
                                                 
37 Berry, J., Subprime Losses Are Big, Exaggerated by Some,  (December 27, 2007), 
Bloomberg.com, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601039&sid=am4LxWcQQbPQ [April 5, 
2009] 
38 Loans to prime-credit borrowers that have combination of non-traditional documentation, 
non-standard product structure, or a more liberal underwriting. Alt A pools generally have 
higher proportions of investor loans and lower average credit scores (690 to 715) than 
conventional conforming or prime jumbo pools. 
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The development of modern subprime mortgage market in the United States 
was facilitated by federal legislation and automated underwriting and 
securitization. 
From 1982 lenders were allowed to offer adjustable-rate mortgages. Also 
the Tax Reform Act of 1986 left residential mortgages as the only consumer 
loans on which the interest was tax deductible.39 This made home equity 
withdrawal a preferred means of financing home improvements and 
personal consumption relative to other forms of consumer loans. 
 
During the 90s subprime lending helped to facilitate a substantial expansion 
of home ownership. These developments allowed a relaxation of credit 
rationing for borrowers previously considered too risky by traditional 
lenders.40 
 
7.3 Expansion of Subprime Lending 
 
Until 2003, the majority of mortgage originations were prime conforming 
loans, which have been then purchased by two government-sponsored 
housing enterprises (Fannie Mae41 and Freddie Mac42). However, by 2006 
half of all originations did not meet the government-sponsored enterprises’ 
(GSE) conforming criteria. 
The transformation of the market was such that, of 2006 originations only 
thirty-six per cent were conforming loans, fifteen per cent were prime 
jumbo loans43, three per cent comprised of loans guaranteed by the Federal 
                                                 
39 Kiff, John/ Mills, Paul, Money for Nothing and Checks for Free: Recent Developments in 
U.S. Subprime Mortgage Markets, IMF working paper, 2007 
40 Ibid.   
41Fannie Mae is a government-sponsored enterprise (GSE) established as a federal agency 
in 1938, chartered by Congress with a mission to provide liquidity, stability and 
affordability to the U.S. housing and mortgage markets. Fannie Mae operates in the U.S. 
secondary mortgage market. 
42 Founded by Congress in 1970 to provide liquidity, stability and affordability to the U.S. 
housing market. 
 
43 Jumbo loans are loans larger than the limits set by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. These 
limits are reviewed annually.  
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Housing Association and the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) while 
the remainder comprised nonprime loans; Alt-A twenty-five per cent and 
subprime twenty-one per cent.44 
 
Increase of the subprime lending was boosted by more highly leveraged 
lending against rapidly rising house prices. Housing affordability level 
dropped and significant group of borrowers was able to obtain loan even if 
they were financially overstretching their financial resources. At the same 
time speculative borrowers who were expecting collateral appreciation 
would obtain loans without taking into account if they were able to make the 
required mortgage payments. Hence, average subprime borrowers credit 
score rose, it was due to the use of second lien loans. The second lien loans 
need not necessarily be declared to the primary mortgage lender.45  
 
At the same time, many financial intermediaries loosened their underwriting 
standards. This was driven by the strong appetite for higher yield securities. 
One of the difficulties of securitization is the fee-driven remuneration at 
each stage. Therefore financial intermediaries are rather interested 
generating loan volume rather than quality, even as the credit spreads on the 
resulting securities shrank. In this process credit risk is dispersed and makes 
it for the safeguards more difficult to monitor and ensure prudent lending.  
 
As the market prices appreciation of houses begun to slow down and the 
house prices later started to decline, rapid deterioration started between 
2006 and 2007. While prices were rising and the housing bubble was 
getting bigger, distressed borrowers had the equity to sell their homes and 
prepay their mortgages. However, as interest rates rose and house prices 
started to flatten and later begun to decline in certain regions, many of the 
speculative and stretched borrowers were left with no choice but to 
default.  
                                                 
44 Kiff, John / Mills, P., Money for Nothing and Checks for Free: Recent Developments in 
U.S. Subprime Mortgage Markets, IMF working paper, 2007. 
45 Zimmerman, Thomas: The U.S. Subprime Market: An Industry in Turmoil, UBS 
Securitized Products Strategy Group, March 2007. 
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Eventually securities which were held by financial firms lost their value, 
because they have been backed by these subprime mortgages.  
 
The financial crisis was caused by a mix of various factors which emerged 
over a number of years  
 Risky mortgage products  
 Investor rewarded growth during the boom even if it was not 
sustainable 
 High personal and corporate debt levels 
 Deregulation 
 
 
7.4 Impact on the Financial Institutions 
 
Between the year 2005 and 2006 default on subprime mortgages started to 
increase and affected mostly banks with subprime specialist subsidiaries 
(e.g. HSBC, Citigroup, UBS etc.) and a number of specialty finance 
companies. UBS and Citigroup have taken the biggest hits from the sub-
prime crisis.46 
 
Some of the poorly capitalized companies, representing about 40 per cent of 
2006 subprime organisations, have either closed down operations, declared 
bankruptcy, or been bailed or bought out.47  
 
Some of the financial intermediaries have been holding residual interests in 
the subprime securitization transactions, but losses have been limited in the 
beginning. Crucial is the timing of loss realization, not all loans have to 
default at the same time but in such a case the impact of the delinquencies 
can lead a financial institution to bankruptcy. Losses in the securitization 
                                                 
46 Farrel, Sean: UBS forced to seek bail-out after extra $10 billion write-down , The 
Independent (online) , (December 11, 2007), 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/ubs-forced-to-seek-bailout-after-extra-
10bn-writedown-764382.html [May 24, 2009] 
47 Kiff, John/ Mills, Paul, Money for Nothing and Checks for Free: Recent Developments in 
U.S. Subprime Mortgage Markets, IMF working paper, 2007 
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process tend to appear delayed among the holders of unrated and lower 
rated mortgage backed securities and collateral debt obligations equity and 
mezzanine tranches.  
 
The process of loss realization starts to crystallise in hedge funds 
specialising in lower-rated subprime asset backed securities48 (ABS) and 
collateral debt obligations (CDOs). 
 
                                                 
48 ABS is bond or note whose collateral is the cash flow from a pool of financial obligations 
such as mortgage, car loans, or credit card recievables  
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8 UBS  
8.1 History of UBS 
 
In June 1998, Union Bank of Switzerland and Swiss Bank Corporation 
(SBC) completed the merger announced six months previously. 
Just two years later, UBS acquired the US brokerage firm PaineWebber, 
greatly increasing the size and scope of its business. Its history extends 
many generations into the past, particularly in Switzerland, the USA, and 
the UK. 
The core components of today’s UBS date back to the second half of the 
nineteenth century. Union Bank of Switzerland, SBC, and PaineWebber or 
their antecedents were all founded in the 1860s and 1870s. Phillips & Drew, 
the London stockbroker acquired by Union Bank of Switzerland in the mid-
1980s, was founded in 1895. But Dillon Read, SBC’s last acquisition before 
its merger with Union Bank of Switzerland, originated as early as 1832. 
A central constituent of UBS Investment Bank, S.G. Warburg, was 
established just after the Second World War when acquired by SBC in 1995. 
The Chicago-based firms of O’Connor (founded 1977) and Brinson Partners 
(founded 1989) were upstarts when acquired by SBC in 1992 and 1994, 
respectively. In melding these varied firms into a single enterprise, UBS 
transformed itself in the course of the 1990s. SBC’s alliance with O’Connor 
radically changed the firm’s culture. For its part, the merger of Union Bank 
of Switzerland with SBC altered the competitive landscape. Then the 
PaineWebber acquisition in 2000 shifted the firm’s centre of gravity 
decisively beyond Switzerland and Europe. 
The effect of these moves was nothing less than to transform SBC and 
Union Bank of Switzerland, two predominantly Swiss banks, into the global 
institution that is UBS today.49 
 
 
                                                 
49 http://www.ubs.com/1/e/about/history.html [Retrieved January 29, 2009] 
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8.2 Core Business  
 
Traditionally this Swiss banking institution was for a long time the leader in 
the national market managing money of private clients. Prudent risk 
management and financial expertise were the guarantee for its depositors 
and clients. 
The main business relies on four areas listed by its importance: 
 
 Global Wealth Management and Business Banking  
 Investment Banking 
 Corporate Centre (consists of its operational functions plus the 
information technology infrastructure and offshoring units) 
 
8.3 Development of Business in Recent Years 
 
UBS changed in a very short time from a company that is primarily 
operating in the Swiss home market to a global institution.  This bares 
unknown risks in business where the bank does not have enough experience. 
The larger the step the easier it is to loose oversight and control, especially 
if it is highly important to recruit and carry out the oversight of a very risky 
and confident business. The distance between the operating units makes it 
more difficult to have control of the day to day business and shifting of 
responsibilities.  
 
8.4 Loses and effects of the subprime mortgage 
crisis 
 
UBS as the world greatest wealth manager has been traditionally 
conservative in operating with client deposits. Nevertheless with the 
expansion into new markets especially the American it entered new business 
in that it did not have a lot of experience. This new business ended up not to 
be as successful as the traditional core business lines.  
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8.4.1 Market entry in to the US mortgage market 2007 
 
In 2006 American housing market predictions have been very optimistic. 
According to The State of the Nation’s Housing Report 2006 from the 
Harvard University Joint Centre for Housing Studies, in spite of higher 
interest rates and home prices “sharp drop in the house prices are unlikely 
anytime soon”.50  
 
Similar to other bubbles as discussed in the chapter 2.1.1 about the anatomy 
of a financial crisis, the entry of UBS into the US real estate market was 
based on the positive forecast and also on the steps that the competition was 
making. Unfortunately the risks that have been taken did not reflect the real 
possibility of the market and creditors. The policies of the bank risk caption, 
risk exposure and monitoring did not sufficiently help to stabilise the bank.  
Regulators have long had a lower capital requirement on loans that are not 
backed by deposits. But in 2004, the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) removed rules that capped leverage at 15 to 1 for investment banking 
firms. That allowed firms to vastly expand their lending activities without 
raising new capital. By that time the regulatory separation between 
investment banks and traditional banking had been removed. So traditional 
banks such as Citigroup shifted more and more of their lending operations 
to their investment banking divisions, and leverage took off. By the end of 
2007, many banks were lending $30 for every dollar they had in their vault. 
Change in the net capital rule is one of the leading contributors to the 
current financial crises.51 
 
It is important to mention that the loss that have occurred, have been caused 
almost exclusively by the involvement in the US mortgage market. Other 
business groups and areas had positive performance. Unfortunately, the 
negative performance of one business group was so large that the whole 
group has recorded severe loss. 
 
                                                 
50 Joint Centre for Housing Studies, State of the Nation’s Housing Report ,  Harvard 
University, 2006 
51 Gandel, Stephen :America’s Broken Banks, TIME, February 9, 2009, p.19 
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Understandably, investment banking is usually the most risky business but 
therefore also the capacities which are involved in the management of these 
funds and assets should be able to manage these assets according to their 
volatility. Credit risk is the main risk in the banking business but in this case 
the combination with operational risk and overall breakdown of the US 
mortgage business even worsen the banks position. 
The managers of the bank were not aware of the worst case scenario of a 
break down of the whole housing market. The riskiness does not lie solely 
in the participation in the securitization business, which was the fuse of the 
subprime mortgage crisis, but more to the extent to what the bank has 
exposed itself.  
 
The later entry into the market than other big players in a hedge-fund 
venture in 2005 was also one of the reasons that did not make it a rentable 
business. Late entry made it much more difficult to attract and keep 
experienced top people who might be more successful in managing the 
department of an investment bank, not the core business of this financial 
institution.  
 
8.5 Breakdown of the losses 
 
The entry to the American market was carried out through the creation of 
alternative management venture Dillon Read Capital Management, 
established in June 2006. This step led to an overweight exposure to the US 
mortgage market. 
 
Hence the profitable performance in the majority of other business wealth, 
investment banking and equity underwriting return on equity performance 
indicator (for the whole group) was negative 11.7 per cent in 2007, down 
from positive 23.9 per cent in 2006 first time in the past, the operating 
income in 2007 totalled CHF 30.6 billion with a negative net income .  
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Figure 8.1: Net profit/loss attributed to the UBS shareholders 
 
The group net loss in 2007 of CHF 4,384 million52 resulted almost 
completely from the exposure to the US residential real estate market 
through positions in mortgage-backed securities.  
 
In the second half of 2007, UBS was severely affected by the progressive 
market dislocation. This led to total losses of approximately USD 18.7 
billion (CHF 21.3 billion) on UBS's positions related to the US residential 
sub-prime and Alt-A real estate market, representing a combination of write 
downs, hedge gains and losses, realized losses from the scale of position and 
credit valuation adjustments on credit default swaps (CDSs) purchased from 
monoline insurers. Losses on securities related to US sub-prime residential 
mortgages totalled USD 14.6 billion, of which USD 9.2 billion were 
recorded on super senior tranches of collateralized debt obligations (CDOs). 
Positions related to Alt-A mortgages lost USD 2 billion due to spread 
widening towards the end of the year. Losses of USD 1.3 billion were 
                                                 
52 UBS Annual report 2007, 
http://www.ubs.com/1/e/investors/annualreporting/2007.html?template=layer&selected=12
5273 , [Retrieved July 28, 2009] 
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incurred on US structured credit programs. Total credit valuation 
adjustments on protection bought from monoline insurers were USD 0.8 
billion in 2007, reflecting the degree to which UBS considers its claims 
against these counterparties to be impaired.53 
 
According to the annual report the losses were caused in two major business 
groups Global Asset Management and Investment Bank.  
 
The total business group performance of Global Asset Management was 
positive but down by 6 per cent form 2006. The downward development 
reflected closure costs of CHF 384 million from Dillon Read Capital. This 
charge increased the total operating expenses and the final business group 
performance. 
 
The negative performance of the Investment Bank business group for the 
year 2007 summed up to CHF -15,681 compared to the positive 
performance of CHF 5,943 in the year 2006 has been cause due to losses in 
fixed income (sale of debt securities), currencies and commodities (FICC) 
on sizeable positions related to the US mortgage market (figure 8.2). 
Performance in other areas remained strong. Equity revenues gained 13 per 
cent form 2006 and investment banking revenues were up by 39 per cent 
from previous year. 
 
                                                 
53 UBS Annual report 2007, 
http://www.ubs.com/1/e/investors/annualreporting/2007.html?template=layer&selected=12
5273 , [Retrieved July 28, 2009] 
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Figure 8.2: Income in the business area Investment Bank of UBS 
 
 
8.5.1 Measures taken after reviewed losses in 2007 
 
The investment in American mortgages was terminated on 3 May 2007 by 
closing alternative investment business Dillon Read Capital Management, 
with an estimated of loss around $425 million.54 The proprietary funds were 
being transferred from the Global Asset Management to the Investment 
Bank.  
  
After the first great losses made in 2007 action has been taken to strengthen 
the traditional core business, wealth management. Doing so, involved two 
major investors: the Singapore Government Investment Cooperation, which 
is responsible for managing the state’s foreign reserves and an unidentified 
Middle Eastern investor.55 The major reason for the involvement of other 
investor was to strengthen the credibility. Credibility of the bank is 
                                                 
54 The Economist, London: July 14, 2007, Vol. 384, Iss. 8537; pg.83 
55 Farrel , Sean: UBS forced to seek bail-out after extra $10bn write-down,  
The Independent , (December 11, 2007) 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/ubs-forced-to-seek-bailout-after-extra-
10bn-writedown-764382.html [Retrieved May 24, 2009] 
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depending on their ratings by the credit rating agencies. The bank as a safe 
place cannot afford to have customers have any doubts about its reliability 
and the safety of business.  
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Figure 8.3: Return on shareholders equity UBS group 
 
 
The following year 2008 credit losses that have been moved from the 
Global Capital Asset Management business division to the Investment Bank 
business division attributed to the overall net loss of CHF 20,887 million. 
This loss was the largest one in the past decade in the history of the bank. 
This significant risk position exceeded UBS’s risk bearing capacity. Due to 
the significant weaknesses in UBS’s risk management and control 
organization the company failed to assess adequately correlated risks and 
risk concentrations.  
 
The Investment Bank recorded a net credit loss expense of CHF 2,575 
million in 2008, compared with a net credit loss expense of CHF 266 
million in 2007. The change was primarily due to losses on the risk 
positions in FICC (Fixed Income, Currency and Commodities).56 The credit 
business in FICC delivered negative revenues, especially in proprietary 
strategies. Structured products results were down, especially in Europe and 
                                                 
56 Annual report UBS 2008, 
http://www.ubs.com/1/e/investors/annualreporting/2008.html?template=layer&selected=12
5276 [Retrieved June 22, 2009] 
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the US, reflecting the decrease in customer demand for complex derivatives 
transactions. 
 
In May 2008 US residential mortgage-backed securities have been sold to a 
fund managed by BlackRock for proceeds of USD 15 billion and the 
agreement reached in October 2008 to transfer illiquid securities and other 
positions from UBS’s balance sheet to a fund owned and controlled by the 
Swiss National Bank (SNB).57 
 
8.6 Bailout plan UBS 
 
Similar to the circumstances in the American financial sector, UBS is of too 
great importance for the Swiss government to be let down. The structured 
bailout plan that was announced in October foresaw a capital injection. 
Swiss authorities took temporarily exactly a 9.3 per cent stake with a Swiss 
franc 6 billion capital injection.58 
The deal coordinated by ministers, the Swiss National Bank and the Swiss 
Federal Banking Commission injected $60 billion into UBS. This included 
taking the last $50 billion of its toxic assets into a special purpose vehicle of 
its books and owned by the Swiss National Bank.59 This intervention drove 
up the capital ratio towards the new rule due from 2013.  
 
At the core of the tripartite Swiss operation is the decision to take on $49 
billion of toxic UBS assets ($31 billion in the US and $18 billion of non US 
debt) into the new entity. The aim is to gradually sell off these illiquid 
assets, with the central bank receiving the first $1 billion of any profits, and 
it and UBS sharing the rest on a 50-50 basis. 60 
                                                 
57 Annual Report UBS 2008, 
http://www.ubs.com/1/e/investors/annualreporting/2008.html?template=layer&selected=12
5276  [Retrieved June 22, 2009] 
58Gow, David:  Switzerland unveils bank bail-out plan, (16 October 2008), Guardian, 
guardian.co.uk/business/2008/oct/16/ubs-creditsuisse/print [Retrieved March 2, 2009] 
59 Gow, David:  Switzerland unveils bank bail-out plan, (16 October 2008), Guardian, 
guardian.co.uk/business/2008/oct/16/ubs-creditsuisse/print [Retrieved March 2, 2009] 
 
60 Ibid. 
52 
These moves of removing toxic assets might bring UBS to a more normal 
operating mode.  
 
8.7 Regulation response  
 
After the turbulent bailout by the government also the regulation in the 
banking sector is undergoing a tightening change.  
 
The Basel accord was already deemed to be too strict but after the crises it is 
clear that it was not enough. The agreement on the new capital rules 
includes the introduction of a leverage ratio and higher capital adequacy 
targets.  Even though existing Swiss rules demanded extra twenty per cent 
over the Basel II rules that were already deemed conservative compared to 
the international standards, recent failure has shown there is still more space 
for more prudence. 
The leverage ratio is a nominal cap on a bank’s debt level regardless of the 
risks involved. 
 
The new capital adequacy target ratio will be in a range of between fifty and 
hundred per cent above the international minimum requirement of Basel II, 
a risk-based capital framework that aims to ensure that the banks worldwide 
meet comparable requirements for matching reserves to the risks they face. 
 
The timeline for the fulfilment of the new capital adequacy requirements has 
been set to the year 2013 but the deadline can be extended depending on the 
situation on the financial markets. 61 Especially the weakened UBS already 
announced it will need more time to comply compared with Credit Suisse.62 
The planned tier 1 ratio would have been 11.9 per cent at the end of 
September taking into account the state bailout.  
 
                                                 
61 Reuters on line UPDATE 2-Swiss regulators, big banks agree new capital rules, 
(December 4, 2008), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/rbssFinancialServicesAndRealEstateNews/idUSL44792632
0081204 [Retrieved January 20, 2009] 
62 Ibid. 
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9 Citigroup 
 
9.1 Introduction 
 
Citigroup Inc. is a global diversified financial service company whose 
businesses provide a broad range of financial services.  
On June 16, 1812, with $2 million of capital, City Bank of New York (now 
Citibank) opened for business in New York City. In 1968, First National 
City Corporation (later renamed Citicorp), a bank holding company, became 
the parent of Citibank. In 1998, all Citicorp divisions merged with all 
divisions of Travelers Group to form Citigroup Inc. Citibank continue as 
under the Citigroup umbrella. 63  
Citibank grew but since 2008 it has to reorganize and cut some of its 
activities to concentrate on its core business. 
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Figure 9.1: Organizational structure of Citigroup 
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9.2 Subprime crises and its impact on the 
consumer business  
 
From the detailed credit loss experience in the US consumer market over the 
last few years it is visible that the deterioration of the housing prices and the 
following subprime crisis heavily affected the losses in the consumer 
business section. As we can see from the table 9-1 below the rapid increase 
of credit loss in the consumer business happened largely due to the 
deterioration in the US market where Citi is primarily active. The lax 
lending practices allowed lending money to customers that had lower credit 
scores or did not provide a sufficient documentation of credibility. This 
resulted in large delinquencies. Unfortunately annual report does not 
provide detailed information on the lending practices. For a comprehensive 
analysis more information also from other banks in the market would be 
needed to identify the problems in the structuring and the lending practices. 
 
 On the other hand, the observed large incline of the corporate credit losses 
in 2008 shows the impact of the financial crises that has spread from the US 
to the rest of the world. In the corporate segment the losses are ten times 
higher than year ago mainly due to loans to financial institutions in offices 
outside of the US and commercial and industrial credit in and outside of the 
US . 
 
 In million 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Consumer in 
U.S. offices $6,927 $5,829 $4,413 $5,766 $11,676 
Consumer in 
offices outside 
of the U.S. 
$3,304 $2,964 $3,915 $5,150 $7,172 
Corporate $632 $915 $312 $948 $9,094 
Table 9-1: Credit loss experience consumer & corporate business at Citigroup64 
 
The subprime crises in the U.S. housing market led also to higher 
unemployment rates. Higher unemployment rate have a direct impact on the 
loan delinquencies. These in turn raise the credit costs of the banks. The 
credit costs in North America, where Citigroup is holding the main position 
compared to the rest of the world, increased by $7,300 million from 2007. 
                                                 
64 Annual Report 2008 Citigroup  
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The increase was caused by $5.1 billion increase in net credit losses and a 
$2.2 billion increase in loan loss reserve builds, for the expected losses due 
to the negative economic development.  
EMEA credit costs increased by 33 per cent mainly in the Western 
European countries. In Latin America credit costs increased $394 million 
reflecting higher net credit losses in Mexico and the Asian credit costs 
increase of 27 per cent was mainly driven by the credit costs in India.  
Cards credit costs increased $1.9 billion, due to an increase of $916 million 
in net credit losses and an increase in reserve build-ups of $936 million. 
ICG increased $2.2 billion, reflecting loan losses reserves for specific 
counterparties, a weakening in credit quality in the corporate credit 
environment and an increase in net credit losses associated with loan sales. 
 
It is expected that in 2009, not just the U.S. market but also the rest of the 
world that has been negatively affected by the financial crisis will operate in 
challenging credit and economic environment (bankruptcy, rising 
unemployment rate, lower residential real estate prices, political and 
regulatory developments). Deterioration is expected for credit costs in all 
products, particularly in the mortgage portfolios as Citigroup is still holding 
a large portion of these positions due to the deflation of the prices in the 
market.  
9.3 Indicators of financial health 
 
Citigroup started as other American banks with a traditional bank operating 
model.  The pivotal role plays the leverage between the deposits and loans. 
The mix of deposits that have relatively low interest rate and credits that 
have higher interest rates makes a bank profitable in the long run.  
 
But starting in the 1970’s, banks began funding less and less of their lending 
in the original more prudent way and the bank deposits were backed no 
longer by 90 per cent of the deposits but lowered to 60 per cent.  
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Another factor which loosened the prudence was the changes in the banking 
regulations. In 2004 the Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
removed the rules that settled the leverage at 15 to 1 for investment banking 
companies. After this action taken, firms consequently expanded vastly their 
lending activities without raising new dollars of capital.  
This was a misjudgement of the regulators. The aim of the regulator is to 
watch companies Tier 165 capital ratio and require a well capitalized holding 
company to hold at least 6 per cent Tier 1 capital. In the case of large, 
important or rapidly expanding financial institutions it is expected to have 
significantly more. Even if the capital ratio of the Citigroup was higher than 
the 6 per cent over the last 5 years (see figure), it still was not appropriate 
for the risks that have been taken. At this point we have to clarify that the 
calculated tier 1 capital ratio is based just on the on-balance sheet assets. If 
we would include also the off-balance sheet assets , the tier 1 ratio would be 
even lower as the off-balance sheet vehicles recorded vast losses or their 
assets became illiquid after the deterioration of the market for certain 
financial products. More detailed overview of the impact of off-balance 
sheet activities is presented in the part 9.6. 
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Figure 9.1: Tier one capital ratio Citigroup 
 
Balance sheet and the requirements of the SEC reporting give us also a good 
picture of the financial soundness of Citigroup. With the adoption and 
                                                 
65 Percentage of stockholders equity and other stocks against total assets, after risk 
adjustments. 
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introduction of a new valuation technique in 2007 by SEC and FASB to 
serve the need for increased consistency and comparability in fair value 
measurement assets and liabilities are divided into 3 levels based on whether 
the inputs to the valuation are observable or unobservable. The 
implementation of the new rule of SFAS 157 was adopted by Citigroup in 
the fiscal year beginning January 1, 2007.  
 
According to the available numbers for 2007 and 2008 (table 9-3) Level 3 
assets make up $133,447 million of total assets. In conjunction with just a 
slight loss in Level 2 assets Citigroup would be insolvent. In the following 
year 2008 the situation is even more complicated where equity is lower than 
the assets in the Level 3 group. Additionally assets classified as Level 2 rose 
by more than half from the previous year. 
 
Assets (in million USD) Level 1 Level 2 Level 3    Equity 
2007 $223,263 $938,578 $133,435   $113,447
2008 $144,547 $1,444,117 $145,947   $141,630
Table 9-2: Assets by class- Citigroup 66  
 
 
In comparison with Bank of America whose Level 3 assets represent only 
33, 55 per cent of total equity (see table 9-3.). Citigroup’s Level 3 assets are 
equal or higher than its common shareholders equity.  
 
Assets (in million USD) Level 1 Level 2 Level 3    Equity 
2007 $65,387 $ 781,805 $31,470   $146,803
2008 $74,876 $1,504,539 $59,409   $177,052
Table 9-3: Assets by class - Bank of America67 
 
 
As there is no available data for the previous years we can just assume that 
the classification of the assets has been very similar to the available data. 
Based on this assumption, Citigroup needs to shift more assets to the Level 
                                                 
66 Annual report 2008 Citigroup, http://www.citigroup.com/citi/fin/data/ar08c_en.pdf 
[Retrieved August 20, 2009] 
67 Annual report 2008 Bank of America, http://media.corporate-
ir.net/media_files/irol/71/71595/reports/2008_AR.pdf  [Retrieved September 13, 2009] 
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1 and decrease the holding of Level 2 and Level 368 assets to control its 
exposure to the unpredictable risks. As for modelling risks more reliable and 
larger data is required.  
 
9.4 Business growth and acquisitions 
 
Citigroup is said to be too big to function. In the last decade it merged with 
many other financial institutions and became world leader in the US and 
world banking sector. As the world’s greatest financial service network with 
over 200 million costumer accounts in more than 100 countries, it is one of 
the world’s largest banking institutions by revenues. Unfortunately 
writedowns that the bank had to record forced the top management to split 
this bank into two separate units.  
 
The idea of the management was to create a banking institution which can 
serve customers in all needs that a banking customer can require, like a huge 
financial supermarket that unites everything from traditional consumer 
banking, wealth management, and securities trading to global investment 
banking.  
 
Even though it was the largest bank in 2005 it ranked just fifth in terms of 
domestic deposits, according to the annual data released by the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corp. With just 3.5 per cent of the country’s $5.9 trillion 
in deposits Citigroup was behind Bank of America, JP Morgan Chase & 
Co., Wachovia Corp. and Wells Fargo & Co. At that time its main focus 
was to expand in the US market. With the expansion Citigroup hoped to 
generate revenue by getting traditional savings and checking-account 
customers to sign up for its mortgages, credit cards and financial services or 
products.  
                                                 
68 Level 1 - Quoted prices for identical instruments in active markets. Level 2 - Quoted 
prices for similar instruments in active markets; quoted prices for identical or similar 
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significant inputs and significant value drivers are observable in active markets. Level 3 - 
Valuations derived from valuation techniques in which one or more significant inputs or 
significant value drivers are unobservable. 
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Expansion does not always imply that with the growth the bank will also get 
more profitable. With the growing size also the expenses of the financial 
institution will rise. In addition Citigroup was growing through mergers. 
Acquiring a branch-heavy bank is not a simple process. Most important, 
bank acquisitions require substantial investments in order to integrate 
deposit systems and other products. Furthermore, bringing two or in the case 
of Citigroup more than two bank systems under one roof can cause 
disruption for customers, who may than flee to another bank.  
 
The pace at which Citigroup was heading to the top of the US market 
resulted in some disadvantageous decisions. Already with the acquisition in 
November 2000 of the Dallas-based Associate for $27 billion Citigroup got 
involved into the high risk lending business. With this acquisition Citigroup 
became US largest subprime lender or provider of finance to high-risk 
customers typically rejected by mainstream banks.69 
In comparison to Citigroup other banks that have managed better to go 
through and get out of the financial crisis with better results like Wells 
Fargo, which was named as the World’s safest US bank 2009, these banks 
are not following such an aggressive acquisition politics. Wells Fargo’s 
global presence is concentrated only in India operating under the name 
Wells Fargo Indian Solutions which is a wholly owned subsidiary of Wells 
Fargo. It seems to be more adequate for a financial institution to concentrate 
on its strength rather than to be present in every business line or in as many 
countries as possible.  
9.5 Oversight and control 
The other danger that rose from the extensive network is the problematic 
oversight and control. Risk management has to be independent and it cannot 
be assured that this was the case with Citigoup. If you are a financial 
institution of this size you need to have installed controls, have established 
the right culture and have most important people accountable for the risk 
that they are willing to take. A big bank with a large network should 
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understandingly strive toward aggressive oversight and is keen on looking 
over any shoulder and guard against trading or lending excesses.  
This was not the cause with Citigroup. Corporate culture at Citigroup made 
it possible for one executive to carry too much weight. Close ties between 
the traders and the oversight made it possible to execute many high risk 
businesses which would not be possible under proper oversight and 
control.70 The downfall of the banks was not triggered by the mortgage 
crisis; the financial crisis just enhanced already present problems with lax 
lending practices. Managers responsible for the management and risk 
management system did not investigate deeply and accurately enough. Their 
judgment was clouded by longstanding ties between managers. Risk 
managers at Citigroup did not investigate deeply enough to locate the 
troubled mortgages and deals that have been made by the other managers. 
Early in 2008, the Federal Reserve has sent a report to Citigroup, where it 
disclosed poor oversight and risk controls.71 
 
Besides the expansion in the US market Citigroup was striving for a leading 
position in the worldwide financial arena. But operating in more than 
hundred countries requires a strong and reliable infrastructure. 
Unfortunately it seams that Citigroup did not invest enough in technology 
and infrastructure. If you are a financial institution of this size you need to 
have installed controls, have established the right culture and have most 
important people accountable for the risk that they are willing to take.  
 
9.6 Off balance sheet vehicles and its impact on 
the overall performance 
 
Analyzing Cititgroup profits over the past few years remains highly 
complicated. This is because the financial statements to determine the 
revenues and losses development values may be unreliable.  
                                                 
70 Ibid. 
71 Appleton, M.: Citigroup Saw No Red Flags Even as It Made Bolder Bets, (November 23, 
2008) , http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/23/business/23citi.html [Retrieved January 5, 
2009] 
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Even though during the past 10 years its business has been growing steadily 
every year till 2006 when profit started to decline (see figure 9.2), the 
realisation of the profits is not adequate to date to show when the losses 
actually occurred. The revenues peaked in 2005 with $24,589 millions and 
according to the annual report 2008 Citigroup recorded loss of $27,684 
millions. Unfortunately the numbers do not give real pictures of the 
financial health of the company because many of the off balance sheet 
activities have not been included in the years between 2001 and 2006. These 
off balance sheet activities have been consolidated in the Cititgroup balance 
sheet starting in 2007, when the profits dramatically dropped.  
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Figure 9.2: Net profit/loss Citigroup 
 
 
 
Citigroup had been involved in many types of off balance sheet agreements 
as special purpose entities (SPE), qualified special purpose entities (QSPE) 
special purpose vehicles (SPV) and variable interest entities (VIE).  
Such a special purpose entity may take the form of a corporation, trust, 
partnership or unincorporated entity. All these four names describe off 
balance sheet financing forms. These firms or legal entities are established 
by a sponsor to fulfil some narrowly defined, specific or temporary purpose. 
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Off-balance or on-balance sheet vehicles created by the sponsoring firms 
can be used in a variety of transactions:  
 
 Securitization (e.g. mortgage securitization with CDOs, credit card 
securitization etc.) 
 Risk sharing,  
 Asset transfer (asset-liability management) 
 Competitive reasons (especially in IT and other branches where 
intelligence technology is highly important) 
 Financial engineering 
 Regulatory reasons 
 Property investing. 
 
It is very difficult to predict what losses can be expected from these off-
balance assets and liabilities. The disclosure for these assets and liabilities 
are much thinner then for balance-sheet assets.  
 
In addition, Citigroup owns almost 25 per cent of the SIV (special 
investment vehicle) market. This is nearly $100 billion of assets under 
management. Nominally, these off-balance sheet vehicles should be 
independent entities, but in reality they are closely tied to the bank. This 
speculation has been made possible by the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act72 
in 1999. The repeal made it possible for financial institutions to undertake 
investment and commercial banking at the same time. The end of the 
separation between the investment banking and traditional banking made it 
possible to shift more and more of the lending operations to their investment 
division and the leverage took off.  
 
This is not the first time that the SPV have been used to hide losses or 
fabricate earnings. In 2001 there was the Enron scandal. Citigroup and JP 
                                                 
72 This act was passed by in 1993 by the U.S. Congress as a response to the large number of 
failed banks during the Great Depression. Established the FDIC as a temporary agency and 
separated commercial banking from investment banking, establishing them as separate lines 
of commerce. 
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Morgan Chase had been helping with another financial institution to cover-
up the losses and manipulate financial statements by using not restricted 
financial engineering schemes.73 Even if these schemes have been in order 
with the valid accounting principles it cannot be excluded that Citigroup 
introduced them to conceal important information to the investors. At the 
end Citigroup resolved claims and paid $1.66 billion to the Enron 
Bankruptcy Estate which represented the Enron creditors.74  
 
Citigroup is not the only bank in the US market that uses off-balance sheet 
engineering to manipulate objective risk exposure. Unfortunately, Citigroup 
was involved to a much higher extent than other banks in the US market 
with off-balance sheet vehicles. Just for comparison Merrill Lynch had 
$22.6 billion in VIEs, Lehman committed to guarantying $6.1 billion of its 
VIEs, Bank of America which is comparable in size with Citigroup is 
exposed to SPE with $81 billion and has unconsolidated $49,651 in VIEs. 
According to the 2008 SEC filling, Citigroup hold $320 billion in 
unconsolidated VIEs. Comparing these numbers shows that Citigroup was 
excessively moving riskier assets to its off-balance sheet vehicles, to a much 
higher extent than other banks in the US market, to avoid consolidation and 
the following reduction of the tangible common equity ratio75, which 
indicates financial strength of a company. It has fallen from 4.3 per cent in 
2006 to about 1.5 per cent in 2009 also due to the absorption of the off-
balance sheet entities. Compared with Bank of America that is at 2.68 per 
cent in 2009 and JPMorgan with 3.8 per cent Citigroup’s TCE it is still very 
low. Usually regulators wish the banks to achieve TCE of 4 per cent. 
 
                                                 
73 Sapsford,J.; Citigroup half Enron bei Buchungstricks , 
http://www.handelsblatt.com/archiv/citigroup-half-enron-bei-buchungstricks;548840 
[Retrieved September 30, 2009] 
74 Dash, E.; Citigroup settles with Enron creditors , 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/27/business/worldbusiness/27iht-CITI.1.11463178.html 
[Retrieved September 26, 2009] 
75 Total common equity ratio of a company is calculated by dividing tangible common 
equity by its tangible assets and gives a measure of financial health of a company. TCE 
ratio shows what owners of ordinary common shares would receive after the bank would be 
liquidated. TCE ratio is more conservative than Tier 1 capital ratio.  
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All these investments into CDO and off-balance sheet vehicles do not 
necessarily have to lead to not profitable businesses but Citigroup employed 
these instruments heavily in the US housing market. The collapse of the 
housing market just disclosed the highly speculative arrangements 
(conduits, SPVs, VIEs, and QSPEs) that were used to veil the amount of 
risk that the bank had taken on. With the seizing up of the market prices 
these hard to sell assets went down and were reflected in large writedowns.  
 
Subsequently from 2007 onwards, Citigroup changed its methods of 
accounting for fair vale measurement in the consolidated financial 
statements and for the absorbed balance sheet entities. Till 2009 the 
accounting standards did not compel US companies to consolidate off-
balance sheet holdings. Previously, companies were required to consolidate 
only SPEs in which they had a controlling interest. Under the new rule, a 
response to the not reasonable use of these vehicles, which revise Statement 
140 (FAS 140), previously exempt SPEs will no longer be exempt from 
consolidation on the parent company's balance sheet76 With these steps 
FASB and SEC are trying to fill the lack of disclosure in the banking 
industry.  
These bookkeeping rules were introduced by the SEC and FASB. Prior to 
this statement, there were different definitions of fair value and limited 
guidance for applying those definitions in GAAP. The statement number 
157 obliges financial institutions to value securities that they hold at the 
lesser of two prices: the costs at which they originally bought the securities, 
or at the prices that can be obtained now in the market. Application of the 
market-to-market rules resulted in write downs that reduced the value of 
asset and also the stock prices declined. Therefore the writedowns that had 
to be undertaken reflected nothing more than poor economic judgment that 
has been made during the housing bubble.  
The early warning models that have been used at Citigroup rely on 
mathematical regressions. Many of the banks and rating agencies are using 
                                                 
76 Campbell, A., New FASB standards threaten off-balance-sheet vehicles, (May 19, 2009) 
http://www.risk.net/risk/news/1518424/new-fasb-standards-threaten-balance-sheet-vehicles 
[Retrieved  September, 14, 2009] 
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very similar statistical models. These are mainly focusing on a very short 
period of time. For the forecasting and reliable early warning it is essential 
to account for longer periods.  There are many examples for the past 
experience in the financial markets. The calculation used in Citigroup is 
based on internal credit risk rating system, risk ratings of major rating 
agencies, corporate portfolio database and historical default rates dating 
back to the 1970s. It is highly important to take variances from all the 
periods and not just to model on 40 years ex post data. These do not reflect 
all the imperfections and the risk that might occur in the banking business. 
For a more comprehensive risk rating model longer periods are necessary to 
estimate more realistic forecast of the losses.  
As the banking business is a part of a more complex and imperfect world, 
this needs to be also taken into account. Solely to rely only on mathematical 
models and not to include external factors that have direct or indirect impact 
on the performance of the bank may lead also to failure or bankruptcy of a 
bank.   
Citigroup models looked at mortgages in particular geographical areas but 
never accounted for the possibility of a national housing downturn, the case 
in which millions of homeowners could default on their mortgages. 
Unfortunately this was the case when the US house prices began to decline 
in 2006-2007. The figure number 9.7 bellow shows that the housing bubble 
started to grow very fast in 2004 and deflated later.  The above figure shows 
the average and the median house prices over a 35 year period.  
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Figure 9.3: Median and average sales prices of new homes sold in United States (sales 
include the land)77 
 
Second reason is the moral hazard of managers who are in charge of the 
bank. The incentive structures encouraged focus on short term profits and 
excessive risk taking.  
 
9.6.1 The role of CDO 
 
Since late 2002 Citigroup got more and more involved in investment 
banking. One of the new instruments that it was using along with other 
financial institutions were collateralized debt obligations. Citigroup in 
comparison to the German Bank, which has a lot of properties on its books 
for which the demand is low at the moment, is holding like many other 
financial institutions worthless CDOs. As a part of the credit crunch the 
market for CDOs has seized up. As a consequence of the market, Citigroup 
is holding CDO positions valued by its own estimates, but these estimations 
do not correspond with the real value of these assets. CDO are valued at 
prices based on levels before the financial crises.  
 
 
                                                 
77 U.S. Census Bureau, Annual average data, www.census.gov/const/upstream.pdf ,[August 
18, 2009] 
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9.6.1.1 Collateralized Debt Obligations 
 
Collateralized debt obligations include many forms of bundled debt and are 
a type of structured asset-backed security (ABS) whose value and payments 
are derived from a portfolio of fixed-income underlying assets. Bundling 
many forms of debt can be tricky. Some parts could be sound, while others 
much more vulnerable to default. CDOs are assigned different risk classes, 
or tranches, whereby "senior" tranches are considered the safest securities. 
Interest and principal payments are made in order of seniority, so that junior 
tranches offer higher coupon payments (and interest rates) or lower prices to 
compensate for additional default risk.78 
 
The capital markets arena is much more aggressive than traditional banking. 
To earn higher profits you have to be willing to take higher risk. Managers 
have seen it a good time to build up the business in this sector. At that time 
housing business was booming in the USA making more and more space for 
mortgages that could be pooled together into new securities. Over the past 
few years the CDO business has grown very fast. It has peaked in 2006 and 
broke down in 2008. At that point CDO market dropped down issuing by 
more than 80 per cent (figure 9.4).  
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Figure 9.4:Total issuance of CDOs 
 
 
 
                                                 
78http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Collateralized_debt_obligation [Retrieved March 2009] 
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More than 80 per cent have been issued in American dollars followed by 
EURO. Other currencies paid just a little role with an overall share lower 
than 10 per cent from the total amount, and relatively falling in 2006 and 
2007.  
 
  USD EUR YEN STERLING Other 
2005 209,103.70 43,477.70 5,536.60 9,668.50 4,016.80 
2006 411,946.60 92,749.50 4,959.30 6,106.10 4,883.10 
2007 344,077.60 122,420.90 2,272.40 6,198.40 6,631.40 
2008 22,713.70 30,297.90 451.4 2,881.20 4,753.30 
 
Table 9-4: Total issuance of CDOs by currency 
 
9.6.1.2 Business with Collateralized Obligations at Citigroup 
 
From 2003 to 2005, Citigroup, compared to the trend in the worldwide CDO 
issuance (see figure 9.4), has more than tripled its issuing of CDO’s. The 
issuance during these two years rose from $6.28 billion to more than $20 
billion. This transformation helped Citigroup to become one of the 
industry’s biggest players but has also put it under high risk. On the other 
side Citigroup could receive high revenues from the fees that it charged 
from this business. In 2005 alone it made up to $500 million in fees.79 
 
In 2008, Securities and Banking (S&B) recorded losses of $14,283 billion 
pre tax on its subprime related exposures from the total of $31,794. The US 
subprime-related direct exposures consisted of approximately $12 billion to 
senior tranches80 of CDO’s. 
 
With the expanding business the risk control should be even tighter and new 
or more oversight controls should be installed. In the case of Citigroup they 
have fallen behind. Collateral debt obligations are complex and it can easily 
happen that the risk involved can be underestimated. The banking managers 
                                                 
79 Appleton, M.: Citigroup Saw No Red Flags Even as It Made Bolder Bets, (November 23, 
2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/23/business/23citi.html [Retrieved January 5, 
2009] 
80Senior tranche is considered to be the safest security, because interest and principal 
payments are made in order of seniority. 
69 
have put faith into the grades that were issued by the major credit-rating 
agencies. These were also not counting with a national housing downturn.  
 
9.7 Bailout plan for Citigroup 
Citigroup was hit very severely by the subprime mortgage crisis in 2008. 
The beginning could be seen in the falling stock market prices that began in 
the summer of 2006. 
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Figure 9.5: Stock price Citigroup 
 
The intention of the government was to rescue one of the most important 
financial institutions of the American banking system and avoid the damage 
that the bankruptcy could cause. A huge bank run would not have just 
effects only on the one bank but definitely also on the other banking houses 
and on public wealth. Through a bailout, government might try to avoid a 
bank run. Preventing a bank run is less expensive than a bankrupt bank. The 
enormous funds that are injected in this one institution are being born by the 
taxpayers.  According to the rescue deal by the US government Citigroup 
received $25 billion in October 2008 and another $20 billion of capital in 
November.81 Additionally to the direct investments Citigroup took part in 
the government’s Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) and purchased 
insurance against $301 billion of assets.  
                                                 
81 Wilchins, D.: Citi breakup in sight after Morgan Stanley deal, (Jan 14, 2009), 
http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/quickieslist/articleshow/3977263.cms [Retrieved 
February 12, 2009] 
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“With these transactions, the US government is taking the actions necessary 
to strengthen the financial system and protect taxpayers and the US 
economy”, the three agencies said in a statement. 82 It is not sure if these 
actions will have the desired effect on the stabilization of the system. In 
contrast to the stabilization of the financial system the bailout action of the 
governments also bears exposure to danger. It could put millions of 
taxpayers‘ dollars in jeopardy and encourage financial companies to take 
excessive risk in the belief that the government will again stand up for the 
mismanagement and losses caused by high risk deals with focus on  the 
increase of the short-term earnings and not a sustainable growth. 
Apart from the governmental support Citigroup is also making large 
changes in its own structure. These following changes, according to the 
annual report 2008, should stabilize and decrease risks across the 
organization. 
 Increase of the Tier 1 capital ratio83 to approximately 11.9 per cent.84 In 
the previous years Tier 1 capital ratio was steadily growing but in 2007 
fell down by more than one per cent. This is crucial for the stability and 
prevention of potential losses since this capital ratio represents the 
equity that is held by the bank against its risks. As an example, 
according to the Basel Convergence Accord on capital adequacy, its 
value should be at least four per cent of the bank’s risk-adjusted assets. 
 Increase of structural liquidity (equity, long-term debt and deposits) to 
sixty-six per cent of total assets in the final quarter of 2008.85 
 Reduce assets from $2.4 trillion down to about $1.9 trillion and 
complete 19 divestitures86 to continue its deleveraging. 
                                                 
82 US government reveals Citigroup rescue deal, The Independent , (24 November 2008), 
[www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/us-governement-reveals-citigroup-rescue-
deal-1032556.html [Retrieved February 2, 2009] 
 
83 Core capital or basic equity that serve as a buffer against losses; equity capital and 
disclosed reserves. Tier one capital is one element of risk-based capital. 
84 Annual report 2008 Citigroup, http://www.citigroup.com/citi/fin/data/ar09cp.pdf 
,[Retrieved July 4, 2009] 
85 Ibid. 
86 Ibid. 
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 Reduction in the fourth quarter of 2008 of business expenses by 16 per 
cent in comparison to the fourth quarter of 2007 to $12.8 billion.87 
 Reduction of commercial paper program from $35 billion to $29 billion. 
9.8 Aftermath for Citigroup 
Citigroup announced a restructuring of its large financial network under the 
pressure of the regulators. Citigroup is going back and focusing again on its 
core business. The aim is to stabilise and reduce the losses form previous 
years.  
The reorganization changed its structure to segregate the risky business 
units and the traditional profitable business lines. The chief executive team 
had split the group into two new firms, Citicorp and Citi Holdings. Citicorp 
handles the company's traditional banking work, while Citi Holdings takes 
on the firm's riskier investment assets.  
Citicorp inherits the more profitable and solid consumer banking interests.  
Approximately two thirds of Citicorp’s balance sheet is deposit-funded. It 
has relatively low-risk, high-return assets and it operates in the fastest 
growing areas of the world.88 Primarily it is comprised of the Company’s 
Global Institutional Bank and the Company’s international regional 
consumer banks. 
Citi Holdings consists of the Company’s brokerage and asset management 
business, local consumer finance business, and a special pool of assets.  
This will enable Citicorp to return to profitability much quicker than it 
would have been possible for Citigroup as a single firm. 
These steps might prevent and separate the risk that lies within a large 
corporation. Smaller units are usually easier to overlook and control.  
                                                 
87 Ibid. 
88Annual report 2008 Citigroup, http://www.citigroup.com/citi/fin/data/ar09cp.pdf 
,[Retrieved July 4, 2009] 
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This is just one of the steps that should stabilize this banking institution. The 
next on the way to make a significant progress in strengthening the 
organization involved reducing the balance sheet, expenses and headcount. 
More specifically starting with the reduction in headcount from 375,000 
down to 323,000 and reorganization of technology and operations to create 
more streamlined organization. 
Supplementary Citigroup signed agreements to sell CitiCapital, equipment 
finance unit in North America, and CitiStreet joint venture with State Street 
Corporation. The transaction for CitiCapital closed on July 31, 2008 with a 
sale of net assets of approximately $12,500 million. The transaction of 
CitiStreet to ING Group on July 1, 2008 estimated to generate an after tax 
gain of $225 million. The sales of some parts should help to make Citigroup 
leaner and more clearly arranged.  
As a consequence to the mismanagement the top managers had to resign 
form their positions. Just 17 of Citigroup’s 43 highest ranking executives in 
2006 remain at the company.  
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10 Conclusion 
The main focus of this thesis was to highlight the experience of losses of 
two large banking institutions during financial crisis in comparison with 
bank failure and financial crises in the past. 
The aftermath of the financial crises has shown that the internationalized 
financial markets bear a lot more risks than are taken for granted. None of 
the regulators, be it in the case of Swiss regulation, the European model or 
the American model of legal regulation could prevent failure of the world’s 
greatest banking houses. Especially, authorities in the US market 
responsible for the legal framework lowered or removed restrictions for 
financial institutions (e.g. repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act) and 
consequently banks took their opportunities to involve themselves in less 
prudent activities. Nevertheless, riskiness of activities like securitization, 
which was the fuse of the subprime crisis, does not lie solely in 
participation, but depends on the extent to which the bank has exposed itself 
to it. 
By identifying the losses we can point out the main reasons for failure. The 
banks discovered new opportunities of how to generate profits from fees by 
building mortgages into securities, and selling these securities to investors. 
This enthusiasm was backed up by constantly rising home prices and the 
perceived stability of mortgage backed securities. Banks were trying to 
participate in the housing market boom and to follow the optimism of the 
market, but none of them was taking into account the risk that this business 
was bearing. Especially the involvement in off-balance sheet activities made 
it much more difficult to determine the real risk exposure at Citigroup. Only 
the following absorption of the losses on the balance sheet could give a real 
picture of the degree to which Citigroup was involved in the securities 
market related to mortgage and credit card securitization.  
The main problems of bank failure and risk management seem to lie in the 
methods and the managers who are responsible for the oversight. More 
attention should be paid to the quality of the financial product and its 
74 
structure than to the quantity. Especially in the case of the two banks 
studied, remuneration and the introduction of more securitized products 
played a key role in risk-aversion and the exposure to risk. The complexity 
of structured finance made it difficult to predict how losses would cascade 
down the ladder of investors in securitized assets. Incomplete credit 
histories of subprime and alt-A borrowers made it more difficult to model 
default rates accurately. Forecasts made on these models underestimated the 
potential defaults.  Additionally, banks were not aware of the total downturn 
of the housing market and this possibility was not taken into account in the 
statistical forecasting, even if the data of the available house pricing 
development has shown an inadequate increase that led to a housing bubble. 
Furthermore, remuneration was based generally upon fees that motivated 
business managers to concentrate on the quantity and they did not pay much 
attention to the sustainability of business. The key to success is to 
concentrate on the business lines which bring steady growth over longer 
periods of time rather than participate in high risk revenues during a short 
period of a speculative bubble. It is not always adequate to follow and 
compete with other financial institutions, for many banks which went 
through the financial crisis without such vast loses, this was the right 
behaviour. Even though both banks had very good funding and a stable 
circle of customers, the losses that they have experienced were so large that 
they had to be bailed out by governments. 
The pressure to perform also in the new types of growing business 
distracted Citigroup and UBS from its core business, which was very stable 
and growing at an adequate pace. In such a situation it is more important to 
realize where the bank has a competitive advantage over rivals, not where it 
does not. Crucial to the sustainability seems to be also in that case 
compensation and growth itself. The security business was and in some 
banks still certainly is based on revenue, not on risk-adjusted returns.  
 
Especially UBS underpriced its internal funding. Its investment bank that 
was not directly controlled by the Swiss directors and took advantage of the 
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bank’s overall easy access to the costs of funds without paying an 
appropriate premium for the risk it was taking. 
Regulators can prevent and control just to a certain extent but never assure 
absolute oversight. One of the reasons is the uneconomical burden that 
would arise from huge costs to finance the administration. Nevertheless, 
countries which managed to pick up the failed banks can avoid the negative 
effects and impacts that could occur (e.g. bank run, destabilisation of the 
whole financial system, deep recession etc.) 
As a response to the failed bank industry, regulators already introduced 
more strict regulation (e.g. higher capital adequacy targets, higher tier 1 
capital ratio, more objective valuation methods). Not only to prevent future 
failure of commercial banks but also to protect the injected funds. 
Governments are guaranteeing far more retail deposits than before the crisis.  
Beyond contention the most severe financial crises, which was started by 
the subprime mortgage crisis in the US showed, that the globalization and 
the interconnection of financial business bears not just advantages but also 
large risks arising from these interconnections. Local governments need to 
force the important financial institutions, like UBS or Citigroup, which are 
pillars of a sound and healthy economy to take more responsibility and 
install more adequate measurements to ensure proper risk management and 
adhere to business ethics. 
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Appendix A - German Abstract 
 
Bankenzusammenbruch am Beispiel von UBS und Citigroup 
(Zusammenfassung) 
 
 
Bankenzusammenbruch und Bankenkrisen wiederholen sich immer wieder 
in der Geschichte der Ökonomie. Jedoch die letzte finanzielle Krise hat 
gezeigt dass es immer noch nicht gelungen ist die Risiken richtig 
abzuschätzen um schwere Verluste verhindern zu können.  
 
Die vorliegende Diplomarbeit behandelt die Problematik des Bankenrisikos 
im Zusammenhang mit einer finanziellen Krise am Bespiel von zwei 
Banken Der schweizerischen UBS und der amerikanischen Citigroup. Es 
wird nicht nur ein Vergleich zwischen den beiden Banken vorgenommen, 
viel mehr wird auch der historische Vergleich mit anderen Finanzkrisen 
dargestellt.  
 
Beide Banken haben durch die Subprime-Krise sehr hohe Verluste 
verbuchen müssen. Im näheren Hinblick auf die Verluste kannst festgestellt 
werden, wie unterschiedlich die Verluste in den Bilanzen aufgenommen 
wurden und wo die Probleme der Banken lagen. Anhand des Vergleiches 
wird es auch deutlicher was für einen Einfluss das Rechtssystem auf die 
Finanzinstitute hat und wo die Möglichkeiten der Behörden bei der 
Aufsichtsführung liegen. 
 
Bankenzusammenbrüche können auch in der Zukunft nicht ausgeschlossen 
werde deshalb ist es wichtig aus den vergangenen Bankenkrisen zu lernen, 
um die möglichen Gefahren vorzeitig zu erkenne um anschließend 
rechtzeitig und angemessen zu reagieren damit Verluste minimiert oder 
verhindert werden können. 
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Interne Datenanalyse/Auswertung, Betreuung    
der PC-Räume an der Universität 
 
Jul. 2006 - Sep. 2006 
 
Tecnetcapital, St. Pölten, Österreich 
Praktikum im Bereich venture capital 
 
Okt. 2001 - Jan. 2006 
 
AIESEC Wien 
Internationale Austausch 
Betreuung von Praktikanten 
Veranstaltung von Weiterbildungsseminaren 
 
 
 
 
  
 
78 
Weitere Qualifikationen 
 
Sprachen Slowakisch Muttersprache 
 Deutsch Fließend 
 Englisch Fließend 
 Tschechisch Fließend 
 Spanisch Fortgeschritten 
   
EDV Microsoft Office Sehr gute Kenntnisse 
 HTML, Java  Grundkenntnisse 
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